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Solitary confinement is a deeply entrenched practice in American 
prisons, jails, and detention facilities.  Despite extensive evidence that 
the practice is harmful, it has long been a feature of most states’ 
punishment regimes.  The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment has offered inconsistent, and at times 
limited, scrutiny of solitary confinement. 
This Article explores state constitutional provisions and related 
jurisprudence that offer alternative avenues for challenges to solitary 
confinement.  Various state constitutions prohibit unnecessary rigor or 
abuse, require safe and comfortable prisons or humane treatment of 
prisoners, enshrine rehabilitation or reformation as a purpose of 
punishment, and recognize the dignity of individuals.  In addition, state 
constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment have 
sometimes been interpreted differently from their federal counterpart, 
even where the language of those provisions is identical or similar.  
Indeed, as Justice Brennan has observed, state constitutions are “a font 
of individual liberties.”1 
The notion that state constitutions and state courts may offer greater 
protection of individual liberties than the Federal Constitution is not 
new.  However, there has been limited recognition to date that state 
courts can play an influential role in holding prison officials 
accountable for harmful conditions and practices like solitary 
confinement.  This Article examines the range of constitutional 
provisions and court decisions that improve scrutiny of these harmful 
practices.  Conversely, it points out where challenges to solitary 
confinement through constitutional provisions are still uncharted 
territory.  
The Article is divided into four parts.  Part I describes the 
development and current use of solitary confinement in United States 
 
* S.J.D. Fordham University School of Law. This Article is based on part of my S.J.D. dissertation.  The 
ideas in this Article benefitted from feedback from Professor Youngjae Lee, Professor Deborah Denno, 
and Professor John Pfaff. I am grateful to the editors of the University of Cincinnati Law Review for their 
assistance. 
 1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).  
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prisons. Part II discusses the limited protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment in the context of solitary confinement as a result 
of the federal courts’ interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.  Part III 
analyzes the wide range of state constitutional provisions and state 
court decisions that offer different approaches for challenging solitary 
confinement.  Part IV explores the reasons why state constitutional 
jurisprudence relating to solitary confinement is largely underexplored 
and offers justifications to support further development in this area. 
I. USE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
A. Historical Background 
Solitary confinement was promoted in the U.S. in the late 1700s to 
address “moral corruption”2 in jails where incarcerated people were 
“thrown together in one sordid mass of humanity”3 and not separated 
by age, gender, or offense committed.  Philadelphia’s Walnut Street 
Jail was the first to introduce solitary confinement, constructing 
individual cells for this purpose in 1790.4  In the early 1800s, 
Pennsylvania and New York built new penitentiaries to hold everyone 
in solitary confinement.5  Pennsylvania’s approach was influenced by 
the Quakers’ philosophy of individual reformation.6   
Pennsylvania’s Eastern State Penitentiary opened in 1829 and 
consisted initially of 250 individual cells, each furnished with a Bible, 
where people were held in solitary confinement.7  They worked in their 
cells and were permitted to leave only if they were unwell.8  
Nevertheless, they had extensive outside contact with religious 
instructors and members of a local philanthropic society who 
conducted thousands of visits; they were also frequently called on by 
staff and other approved persons.9 
New York’s Auburn Penitentiary opened in 1817 and initially 
 
 2. MARK COLVIN, PENITENTIARIES, REFORMATORIES, AND CHAIN GANGS: SOCIAL THEORY AND 
THE HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA, at 4 (1997). 
 3. Id. 
 4. David M. Shapiro, Solitary Confinement in the Young Republic, 133 HARV. L. REV. 544, 561 
(2019). 
 5. ANDREW SKOTNICKI, RELIGION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN PENAL SYSTEM 
6 (2000) 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 57. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Act of April 23, 1829, § 21, in Purdon’s Digest of the Laws of Pennsylvania from 1700 – 1846, 
544 (7th ed. 1852). 
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featured both solitary and congregate cells.10  In 1821, eighty people 
were placed in solitary confinement.11  They were forbidden to lie 
down during the day and forbidden from communicating with anyone 
except the chaplain.12  This approach proved “disastrous,” with many 
people harming themselves or attempting suicide within the first 
year.13  Auburn officials then changed the regime so that everyone at 
the penitentiary was placed in a solitary confinement cell, but they 
worked together during the day under the supervision of guards who 
were authorized to whip people who broke the rule of strict silence.14   
The same model was later introduced at New York’s Sing Sing 
Penitentiary.15 
These early regimes were copied to varying degrees in other states.  
By 1833, solitary confinement was used in Maine, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, the 
District of Columbia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, 
Illinois, and Ohio.16  The practice was later introduced in even more 
states, although it was not uniformly imposed for the entire duration of 
a person’s incarceration; in some jurisdictions, a sentence might 
incorporate, for example, twenty days of solitary confinement with the 
remainder to be served at hard labor.17 
Enthusiasm for the early solitary confinement experiments waned, 
and by the 1850s and 1860s, the practice was becoming less common 
but not fully discontinued.18  It continued to be used throughout the 
following century.19  In 1983, the maximum-security United States 
Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, was placed into lockdown after three 
 
 10. COLVIN, supra, note 2, at 88; GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE 
PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 4 (Francis Lieber, 
trans.) (1833). 
 11. GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 5 (Francis Lieber, trans.) (1833). 
 12. SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 
113 (1998). 
 13. SKNOTNICKI, supra, note 5, at 40; W. DAVID LEWIS, FROM NEWGATE TO DANNEMORA: THE 
RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY IN NEW YORK, 1796-1848, 66-69 (1965). 
 14. SKNOTNICKI, supra, note 5, at 70. 
 15. COLVIN, supra, note 2, at 84. 
 16. BOSTON PRISON DISCIPLINE SOCIETY, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1833). 
 17. See, e.g. Howell v. State, 1 Or. 241, 243 (1859) (describing Oregon sentencing statute which 
provided that “in every case in which punishment in the penitentiary is awarded against any convict, the 
form of the sentence shall be that he be punished by confinement at hard labor; and he may also be 
sentenced to solitary confinement for such term as the court shall direct, not exceeding twenty days at one 
time . . .”). 
 18. Ashley T. Rubin & Keramet Reiter, Continuity in the Face of Penal Innovation: Revisiting the 
History of American Solitary Confinement, 43 LAW & SOC. INQ. 1604, 1617-21 (2018). 
 19. Id. 
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guards were taken hostage and one was killed.20  Everyone was 
confined to their cells for twenty-three hours per day.21  The lockdown 
became permanent and lasted for twenty-three years.22  The Marion 
lockdown found favor with prison officials and led to the construction 
of new purpose-built supermax prisons and units throughout the 
country, which consisted entirely of solitary confinement cells.23 
B. Current State of Affairs 
A nationwide survey conducted by The Correctional Leaders 
Association and The Arthur Liman Center for Public Interest Law at 
Yale Law School, of “restrictive housing,” an alternative term used to 
describe solitary confinement, estimated that, as of July 2019, between 
55,000 and 62,500 people were held in such conditions in U.S. 
prisons.24  That estimate does not include people in restrictive housing 
in jails or juvenile, military, or immigration detention facilities, for 
which limited data are available.25   
At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, detention facilities across 
the country implemented lockdowns; Unlock the Box, a national 
coalition of organizations working to end the use of solitary 
confinement in the U.S., estimated that the number of people held in 
solitary confinement or similar conditions in the U.S. increased by 
500% to 300,000.26 
While conditions vary, solitary confinement units have common 
features.27  People are segregated from the general prison population 
and held in cells that are no larger than eighty square feet, similar in 
size to a king-size mattress or small bathroom.28  Some units are not 
temperature-controlled, and insect infestations can be severe, 
 
 20. Bill Dunne, The U.S. Prison at Marion, Illinois: An Instrument of Oppression, in CAGES OF 
STEEL: THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 47-48 (Ward Churchill & J. J. Vander 
Wall eds., 1992). 
 21. ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 49 (2003). 
 22. Id. 
 23. D. A. Ward & T. G. Werlich, Alcatraz and Marion: Evaluating Super-Maximum Custody, 5 
PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 53, 59 (2003). 
 24. THE CORRECTIONAL LEADERS ASSOCIATION & THE ARTHUR LIMAN CENTER FOR PUBLIC 
INTEREST LAW AT YALE LAW SCHOOL, TIME-IN-CELL 2019: A SNAPSHOT OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING 
BASED ON A NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF U.S. PRISON SYSTEMS 5 (2020) [hereinafter CLA-LIMAN 2020].  
The report defines “restrictive housing” as “holding individuals in a cell for an average of twenty-two 
hours or more for fifteen days or more.” Id. at 1. 
 25. Id. at 4. 
 26. UNLOCK THE BOX, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IS NEVER THE ANSWER 1 (2020).  
 27. Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Solitary Confinement is Cruel and Far Too Usual 
Punishment 90 IND. L. J. 741, 753 (2015). 
 28. Declaration of Thomas Silverstein at 31, Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-CV-
02471 (D. Colo. Feb. 4, 2011). 
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particularly in the summer.29  People in solitary confinement eat all 
their meals in their cells, in the same small space in which they sleep 
and use the toilet.30  In some units, toilets are flushed on timers that are 
controlled by prison officers, and people may be forced to eat their 
meals amid the stagnant smell of an unflushed toilet.31  The only 
respite a person in solitary confinement has from these oppressive 
conditions may be an hour of recreation time per day spent alone in a 
steel cage or concrete cell without any exercise equipment.32  Showers 
may be allowed three times per week.33  People in solitary confinement 
can be subjected to strip searches, including body cavity searches, and 
then handcuffed and shackled before they leave their cells.34  
The racial and ethnic disparities of America’s criminal justice 
system are reflected in the use of solitary confinement.  While the 
demographic data are not comprehensive, the available statistics reveal 
troubling inequality.  A 2019 report by the Southern Poverty Law 
Center showed that people of color in Florida’s prisons are 
overrepresented in solitary confinement in relation to their proportion 
in the general prison population. 35  As of December 2018, over 60% 
of people in solitary confinement were Black, but Black people 
constituted only 47% of the total prison population. 36  In contrast, 
34.5% of people in solitary confinement were white despite their 
constituting 40.1% of the total prison population.37   
In July 2019, thirty-two U.S. jurisdictions provided racial and ethnic 
data about their male populations in restrictive housing for the 
nationwide survey conducted by The Correctional Leaders 
Association and the Arthur Liman Center. 38  Only four of the thirty-
two states reported having a higher percentage of white men in 
 
 29. Complaint at 11, Presley v. Epps, No. 4:05-CV-00148 (N.D. Miss. June 22, 2005), 2005 WL 
1842195. 
 30. Complaint at 58, Thorpe v. Virginia Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:19-CV-00332 (E.D. Va. May 6, 
2019). 
 31. Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 38, Harvard v. Inch, No. 19-
CV-212 (N.D. Fla. May 8, 2019). 
 32. SIX BY TEN: STORIES FROM SOLITARY 132 (Taylor Pendergrass & Mateo Hoke eds., 2018). 
 33. See, e.g., KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 26 (2016), AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STILL BURIED ALIVE: 
ARIZONA PRISONER TESTIMONIES ON ISOLATION IN MAXIMUM SECURITY 11 (2014). 
 34. TERRY ALLEN KUPERS, SOLITARY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SUPERMAX ISOLATION AND HOW 
WE CAN ABOLISH IT 32 (2017); Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 34, 
Harvard v. Inch, No. 19-CV-212 (N.D. Fla. May 8, 2019). 
 35. SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: INHUMANE, INEFFECTIVE, AND 
WASTEFUL 8 (2019). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. CLA-LIMAN 2020, supra, note 24, at 30-31. 
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restrictive housing than the total prison population.39  In nineteen 
jurisdictions, on the other hand, Black men constituted a higher 
percentage of the restrictive housing population than in the general 
prison population, fifteen jurisdictions reported the same about 
Hispanic men,40 and twelve about Native American men.41  Of thirty-
one jurisdictions that provided demographic data about their female 
prison populations, nineteen reported that Black women constituted a 
greater percentage of the restrictive housing population than the total 
prison population, six reported the same about Hispanic women, and 
eight about Native American women.42 
C. Harm to Incarcerated People 
The harm caused by solitary confinement was clear almost from the 
outset.  One of the first criticisms of the practice arose from its use in 
Philadelphia’s Walnut Street Jail in the 1790s.43  The purported aim of 
reformation that was said to have justified Pennsylvania’s approach 
did not succeed, and people held in solitary confinement were 
reportedly “corrupted by indolence.”44  The results of Auburn’s first 
experiment led the Governor of New York to pardon people in solitary 
confinement in 1823.45   
Scientific evidence revealing the harm associated with solitary 
confinement today is extensive.46  The risk of physical or 
psychological damage is so great that it outweighs any claimed 
penological justification for the practice.47  Solitary confinement 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. The CLA-LIMAN surveys do not collate separate racial and ethnic data, thus no information is 
available about the racial identity of Hispanic people in restrictive housing. 
 41. CLA-LIMAN 2020, supra, note 24, at 30-31. 
 42. Id. at 33-34. 
 43. GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 3 (Francis Lieber, trans.) (1833). 
 44. Id. 
 45. FRANCIS GRAY, PRISON DISCIPLINE IN AMERICA 39-40 (1847). 
 46. See, e.g., Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH U. J. L. & 
POL’Y 325 (2006); Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief 
History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441 (2006); Craig Haney, The Science of Solitary: 
Expanding the Harmfulness Narrative, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 211, 240 (2020); HUMAN RIGHTS IN TRAUMA 
MENTAL HEALTH LAB, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, MENTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES FOLLOWING 
RELEASE FROM LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (2017); Andrew B. Clark, Juvenile 
Solitary Confinement as a Form of Child Abuse, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &  L. 350, 351 (2017); 
KUPERS, supra, note 34, at 32, 99, 115; Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein et al., Association of Restrictive 
Housing During Incarceration With Mortality After Release, 2(10) J. AM. MED. ASS. 8 (2019). 
 47. Federica Coppola, The Brain in Solitude: An(other) Eighth Amendment Challenge to Solitary 
Confinement, JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE BIOSCIENCES 1, 36-37 (2019) (“The risk of undergoing brain 
damage due to extreme isolation is an excessive – and, therefore, extremely unbalanced – cost for any 
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“induces the bleakest depression, plunging despair, and terrifying 
hallucinations.”48  It contributes to the onset of psychiatric disorders, 
self-harm, and suicide attempts.49  The psychological and psychiatric 
harm can manifest itself as anxiety, depression, panic, withdrawal, 
hallucinations, self-mutilation, intolerance of social interaction, 
obsessional thinking, agitation, irritability and suicidal thoughts and 
behaviors.50  The physiological effects of solitary confinement include 
heart palpitations, insomnia, weight loss, deterioration of eyesight and 
mental acuity, and aggravation of pre-existing medical problems.51 
Recent studies also demonstrate that harm caused by solitary 
confinement can have lasting effects.  Neuroscientific studies shed 
further light on the “traumatic and potentially permanent” harm caused 
by solitary confinement.52  Significantly, electroencephalography 
studies show that as little as a few days of such a regime can produce 
“an abnormal pattern characteristic of stupor and delirium.”53  
Experimental animal research also shows that social and 
environmental deprivation has “negative repercussions for both brain 
structure and function”54 and is associated with high levels of 
aggression and increased susceptibility to psychiatric and 
neurodegenerative diseases.55 
Recent scientific studies demonstrate that there is no rehabilitative 
justification for solitary confinement.56  Even the claim that the 
practice is required for institutional security is dubious in light of 
reports suggesting that, in prisons where solitary confinement units are 
disbanded, levels of violence either drop or remain steady.57  
Deterrence is also questionable as a justification because there is no 
 
legitimate penological interest to allegedly justify it.”; “No penological interest can counterbalance the 
damage that solitary confinement risks imposing on incarcerated people.”). 
 48. MARY E. BUSER, LOCKDOWN ON RIKERS: SHOCKING STORIES OF ABUSE AND INJUSTICE AT 
NEW YORK’S NOTORIOUS JAIL (2015). 
 49. Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and the Case Against Solitary 
Confinement, 21 VAND. J ENT. & TECH. L. 937, 953-54 (2019). 
 50. Stuart Grassian, supra, note 46, at 332-33. 
 51. SHARON SHALEV, A SOURCEBOOK ON SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 15 (2008). 
 52. See, e.g., Federica Coppola, supra note 47. 
 53. Stuart Grassian, supra, note 46, at 331. See also Paul Gendreau et al., Changes in EEG Alpha 
Frequency and Evoked Response Latency During Solitary Confinement, 79 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 
54 (1972). 
 54. Federica Coppola, supra, note 47, at 22-23. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Elizabeth Bennion, supra, note 27, at 779. 
 57. U.S. DEP’T JUST., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE 
HOUSING 75-76 (2016) (Colorado Department of Corrections reported no increase in assaults on staff by 
incarcerated people since implementing reforms to reduce solitary confinement; Washington State 
Department of Corrections reported less violence and fewer instances where prison staff used force at 
intensive management units after implementing reforms to reduce restrictive housing population.). 
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evidence that either short- or long-term solitary confinement reduces 
subsequent rule violations in prisons.58  
The risk of lasting harm resulting from solitary confinement is 
particularly concerning given that most people in prison return to the 
community.59 When they do so, they may be “incapable of 
accommodating to life” due to hypersensitivity and intolerance of the 
typical noise and chaos of social situations.60  They also face the risk 
of leaving prison with fewer life skills61 and diminished psychological 
and emotional capacities.62 A 2019 study of over 200,000 people 
released from prison in North Carolina found that people who had 
spent any period of time in solitary confinement during incarceration 
were more likely to die in the first year after their release from prison 
than people who had not been in solitary confinement.63  The risk of 
death and reincarceration was also higher among people who had been 
in solitary confinement for more than 14 consecutive days or had been 
so placed more than once.64 
D. Reforms 
Some states and prisons have introduced reforms that seek to reduce 
or abolish solitary confinement. The legislatures of Massachusetts, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, and New York have in recent years enacted 
reform legislation that prohibits or curtails the practice.65  In 2017, the 
Colorado Department of Corrections limited solitary confinement to a 
maximum of fifteen days, and in July 2020, the Governor of Colorado 
signed a bill prohibiting the use of solitary confinement for people 
being treated or evaluated for substance use.66  In 2011 and 2012, the 
Maine Department of Corrections adopted new policies to reduce the 
 
 58. Federica Coppola, supra, note 47, citing Robert Morris, Joseph Lucas & Matthew Jones, An 
Analysis of the Deterrent Effects of Disciplinary Segregation on Institutional Rule Violation Rates, CRIM 
J. POL. REV. 1 (2017). 
 59. U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RE-ENTRY TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2017) (“95% of the prison population today will be released at some point in the future.”). 
 60. Federica Coppola, supra, note 47, citing Expert Report of Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects 
of Solitary Confinement at Northern Correctional Institution on Death Row and in Special Circumstances 
Under CGS 18-10b in Reynolds v. Arnone, No. 13-CV-1564 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2018). 
 61. KUPERS, supra, note 34, at 99 (“In the big picture, the decimation of life skills, destroying a 
prisoner’s ability to cope in the free world, is the worst thing solitary confinement does.”). 
 62. Sharon Dolovich, Incarceration, American-Style, 3 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. 237, 249 (2009). 
 63. Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein et al., Association of Restrictive Housing During Incarceration 
With Mortality After Release, 2(10) J. AM. MED. ASS. 8 (2019). 
 64. Id. 
 65. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, §§ 39-39H (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-4,114 
(West 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.5 (West 2020); 2021 N.Y. Sess. Laws (2277-A) (McKinney). 
 66. CLA-LIMAN 2020, supra, note 24, at 82. 
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number of people and length of time spent in solitary confinement and 
to improve conditions.67   
Ongoing judicial oversight is often needed to ensure compliance, 
even in jurisdictions where reforms have been implemented.  Virginia 
provides one such example.  In May 2019, a lawsuit was filed in 
federal court on behalf of men who were held in solitary confinement 
in the state’s supermax prisons for between 2 and 23 years.68  The 
complaint referred to a 1985 settlement in a case in which the state had 
agreed to permanently abolish a “Special Management Unit” (“SMU”) 
where people “spent their entire incarceration in a more draconian 
form of solitary confinement, without the opportunity to obtain 
additional privileges, and with additional attendant harms.”69  The state 
had also agreed that it would not reinstate any similar program in the 
future.70 The 2019 complaint alleged that these provisions were 
violated when the state opened two new supermax prisons where the 
solitary confinement regime was “the equivalent or is similar to the 
SMU under the Settlement Agreement.”71   
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
Though the federal courts were somewhat receptive to the rights of 
incarcerated people in cases brought during the 1960s and 1970s, that 
approach was later abandoned in favor of the view that courts should 
be cautious before interfering with the judgment of prison 
administrators.72  Stringent tests were developed to establish Eighth 
Amendment violations based on conditions of confinement.  The high 
thresholds required to meet these tests, combined with the defense of 
qualified immunity and the statutory barriers imposed by the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), render judicial relief based on the 
Eighth Amendment difficult to obtain in many solitary confinement 
cases. 
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments was taken from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.73  
 
 67. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MAINE, CHANGE IS POSSIBLE: A CASE STUDY OF 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT REFORM IN MAINE 12-13 (2013). 
 68. Complaint at 2, Thorpe v. Virginia Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:19-CV-00332 (E.D. Va. May 6, 
2019). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 34, referring to Settlement Agreement at 1, Brown v. Landon, No. 81-0853-R (E.D. Va. 
Apr. 5, 1985). 
 71. Id. at 36, 87. 
 72. Howard Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. 
U.L.J. 417, 423, 426 (1993). 
 73. Stuart Klein, Prisoners’ Rights to Physical and Mental Health Care: A Modern Expansion of 
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Significantly, the provision in the latter was intended to prohibit 
punishments not specifically authorized by statute or by a sentencing 
judge.74  Despite its derivation, the federal courts have interpreted the 
Eighth Amendment differently.   
In 1958, the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles stated that the words 
of the Eighth Amendment “are not precise, and . . . their scope is not 
static.  The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”75 
In 1962, the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California held that the 
provisions of the Eighth Amendment apply to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.76  It was only in 1978 that the Supreme Court 
first addressed conditions of confinement in Hutto v. Finney, holding 
that conditions of confinement were subject to scrutiny under the 
Eighth Amendment.77  In Hutto, the Court affirmed a remedial order 
entered by the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas to 
address cruel and unusual conditions in Arkansas’ prison system.  One 
of the provisions of the remedial order was a 30-day limitation on 
placements in solitary confinement, which the Court upheld.  
Generally, however, challenges to solitary confinement based on the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment have mixed success.  The courts have taken the position 
that “the mere fact of solitary confinement does not, in and of itself, 
violate the Eighth Amendment.”78 
A. Establishing a Violation 
The Court has developed a two-part test to assess whether 
conditions within prisons violate the Eighth Amendment.79  The test 
comprises an objective component, namely, proof that a given 
condition or deprivation is “sufficiently serious,” and a subjective 
component, namely, that it was inflicted with “deliberate 
indifference.”80  Most challenges to solitary confinement fail to meet 
these two components such that the federal courts decline to find the 
 
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 2 (1979). 
 74. COLIN DAYAN, THE STORY OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 6 (2007). 
 75. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 76. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding a California statute that imposed a 
sentence of imprisonment upon conviction of the offense of addiction to narcotics to be cruel and unusual 
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 77. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). 
 78. Brown v. Faucher, No. 3:19-CV-00690, 2019 WL 3231205 at *3 (D. Conn. July 18, 2019), 
(citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686 (1978)). 
 79. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). 
 80. Id. 
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practice unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.81 
1. Sufficiently Serious Conditions 
To establish a sufficiently serious condition or deprivation, proof of 
serious harm or a “substantial risk of serious harm” is required.82  The 
standard is high.  In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Court held that the 
Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” and only 
deprivations that deny “the minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities” amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.83  In Hudson 
v. McMillian, the Court reasoned that “extreme deprivations are 
required to make out a conditions of confinement claim” because 
“routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay 
for their offenses against society.”84 In one case, a person’s having 
spent thirty years in solitary confinement did not satisfy the objective 
test.85  Even the extreme practice of placing people in isolation in “strip 
cells” without sheets, blankets, or clothing was not regarded by one 
court as a sufficiently serious deprivation.86 
The courts have further held that, to establish a violation, the 
conditions challenged must result in the deprivation of a single need.87  
Solitary confinement rarely presents a single deprivation, unlike 
conditions such as poor food or inadequate sanitation.  The Court in 
Wilson v. Seiter held that a combination of unfavorable conditions may 
violate the Eighth Amendment when any single one of them would not 
do so, but the conditions must have a “mutually enforcing effect that 
produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as 
food, warmth or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night 
combined with a failure to issue blankets.”88  The Court said that 
“nothing so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’ can rise to the level of 
cruel and unusual punishment” when there is no deprivation of a single 
need.89   
The Court’s rejection of the broader “totality of conditions” 
approach is problematic for challenges to solitary confinement.  The 
combination of factors which sustain the practice may result in a range 
 
 81. See infra II.A.1 and II.A.2. 
 82. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
 83. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 349 (1981). 
 84. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. 
 85. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 522, 524 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 86. Guinn v. Rispoli, 323 Fed. Appx. 105, 107, 108 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 87. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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of harms rather than a single deprivation.  Because of the Court’s 
narrow approach, many challenges to solitary confinement must focus 
on a single element of the practice, such as constant lighting,90 lack of 
outdoor exercise,91 or inadequate food.92  Thus the actual experience 
of living in solitary confinement becomes diminished due to the 
artificial focus on a single deprivation. 
A further problem with the “sufficiently serious” standard is that it 
is at odds with another test for harm in Eighth Amendment cases 
alleging excessive force by prison officials.  The Court has held in such 
cases that proof of “significant injury” is not required.93  The claimant 
need only show that the harm was not de minimis.94  The Court 
explained its rationale for the different tests in Hudson: 
In the excessive force context, society’s expectations are different.  When 
prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, 
contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . This is true 
whether or not significant injury is evident.  Otherwise the Eighth 
Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how 
diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.  
Such a result would have been as unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth 
Amendment as it is today.95 
 Justices Thomas and Scalia, dissenting, called attention to the 
inconsistency between the two tests.96  Justice Thomas questioned the 
majority’s reasoning that “society’s standards of decency are not 
violated by anything short of uncivilized conditions of confinement . . 
. but are automatically violated by any malicious use of force, 
regardless of whether it even causes an injury.”97  The justice described 
the distinction as “puzzling”: 
I see no reason why our society’s standards of decency should be more 
readily offended when officials, with a culpable state of mind, subject a 
 
 90. Obama v. Burl, 477 Fed. Appx. 409 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding allegations of constant lighting 
stated claim for violation of Eighth Amendment); but see Stewart v. Beard, 417 Fed. Appx. 117 (3d Cir. 
2011) (holding constant illumination in solitary confinement unit did not violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 91. Perkins v. Kansas Dept. of Corr., 165 F.3d 803 (1999) (holding plaintiff housed in 
administrative segregation stated a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment by alleging that he was 
denied outdoor exercise for more than nine months). 
 92. Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 735 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that an exclusive diet of “nutriloaf,” a 
“bad-tasting food given to prisoners as a form of punishment” could result in hardship that would violate 
the Eighth Amendment); but see Tyler v. Lassiter, WL 866325, (E.D.N.C. March 3, 2016) (holding that 
a seven-day “nutraloaf” diet did not create a substantial risk of harm and therefore did not meet the 
objective test). 
 93. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 94. Id. at 9-10. 
 95. Id. 
 96. The dissenting justices would instead have required proof of significant injury.  
 97. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 25 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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prisoner to a deprivation on one discrete occasion than when they subject 
him to continuous deprivations over time.  If anything, I would think that 
a deprivation inflicted continuously over a long period would be of greater 
concern to society than a deprivation inflicted on one particular occasion.98 
The dissenting opinion highlights the artificial nature of the objective 
test for which there is no basis in the text of the Eighth Amendment.  
However, it would seem that there is equally no basis for the result 
advocated by the dissent.  While the Amendment should be interpreted 
consistently, it should not obstruct legitimate claims of cruel and 
unusual punishment arising from prison conditions.99 
2. Deliberate Indifference 
The deliberate indifference test originated from a case challenging 
the adequacy of medical treatment provided to people in prison.  In 
Estelle v. Gamble, the Court held that to state a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment in relation to medical treatment, incarcerated people must 
“allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs.”100  The Court remarked that 
only deliberate indifference offends “evolving standards of 
decency.”101  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the 
imposition of subjective motivation as the criterion for determining 
whether cruel and unusual punishment had been inflicted.102  He 
considered that the constitutional standard should be based on the 
character of the punishment and not the motivation of the individual 
who inflicted it.103 
In Whitley v. Albers, the Court reasoned that deliberate indifference 
was an appropriate standard in claims involving medical treatment 
because it could “typically be established or disproved without the 
necessity of balancing competing institutional concerns for the safety 
of prison staff or other inmates.”104  Nevertheless, in Wilson v. Seiter, 
the same standard was extended to claims regarding prison conditions 
despite the fact that such conditions are often justified on the basis of 
institutional concerns. 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. See William J. Brennan, Jr., supra, note 1, at 498 (“a solution that shuts the courthouse door 
in the face of the litigant with a legitimate claim for relief, particularly a claim of deprivation of a 
constitutional right, seems to be not only the wrong tool but also a dangerous tool for solving the 
problem.”). 
        100.   Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
 101. Id. at 106.  
 102. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). 
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 In defining “punishment,” the majority in Wilson reasoned that “if 
the pain is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the 
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the 
inflicting officer.”105  The Court referred to Judge Posner’s definition 
of punishment in Duckworth v. Franzen to support its reasoning: 
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.  
This is what the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth 
century . . . [I]f a guard accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner’s toe and broke 
it, this would not be punishment in anything remotely like the accepted 
meaning of the word.106 
Duckworth v. Franzen concerned a fire on an Illinois Department of 
Corrections bus that was transporting people to different prisons.107  
Thirty-five passengers were handcuffed and chained together on the 
bus when it caught fire.108  Only one person managed to get off the 
bus, and he was subsequently pushed back inside by a prison guard.109  
One person died in the fire and others suffered serious injuries.110  
Judge Posner held that a reasonable and properly instructed jury could 
not have found the prison officials’ behavior to be punishment because 
there was no evidence of either deliberate or reckless infliction of 
suffering.111 
i. Definition of Punishment  
The Wilson Court’s narrow definition of “punishment” as 
constituting only the specific penalty imposed by statute or the 
sentencing judge ignores the reality that prison conditions are part of 
the punishment of incarceration.  Justice Blackmun, in his concurring 
opinion in Farmer v. Brennan, took the same view, observing that 
“[t]he Court’s unduly narrow definition of punishment blinds it to the 
reality of prison life.”112  That definition also disregards the 
interpretation of the English Bill of Rights that prohibited punishments 
not authorized by statute or by the sentencing judge.  Moreover, it is at 
odds with the reasoning of Hutto v. Finney, where the Court 
recognized that solitary confinement “is a form of punishment subject 
 
 105. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300. 
 106. Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). 
 107. Id. at 648. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 652-53. 
 112. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 855 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
14
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss2/3
468 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”113  Finally, the 
interpretation is inconsistent with decisions outside the Eighth 
Amendment context.  For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, a Fourth 
Amendment case, the Court referred to solitary confinement as a form 
of punishment.114 
Other federal courts have held that penological justifications for 
conditions of confinement are relevant to whether those conditions 
violate the Eighth Amendment.115  Absent a “legitimate penological 
purpose for a prison official’s conduct, courts have ‘presumed 
malicious and sadistic intent.’”116  Yet that doctrine is defeated because 
of courts’ deference to the decisions of prison officials. Close 
examination is rarely given to the asserted justification that solitary 
confinement is necessary to maintain order and institutional safety.117 
ii. Conditions of Confinement 
The application of the deliberate indifference test to cases involving 
prison conditions is problematic because, unlike those relating to 
medical treatment, these cases do not always involve identifiable 
prison officials to whom this mental element can be attributed.118  This 
was recognized by Judge Posner when he criticized the term 
“deliberate indifference,” labeling it “not self-defining.”119  Judge 
 
 113. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685. 
 114. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987).  
 115. Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235, 1250 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the precise role of legitimate 
penological interests is not entirely clear in the context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions 
of confinement,” but “the existence of a legitimate penological justification has, however, been used in 
considering whether adverse treatment is sufficiently gratuitous to constitute punishment for Eighth 
Amendment purposes.”).  
 116. Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Giron v. Corr. Corp of Am., 
191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 117. See, e.g. Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 559 Fed. Appx. 739, 762 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(“While Mr. Silverstein’s thirty-year duration in segregated confinement is an extraordinary length of 
time, we defer to the [Bureau of Prisons’] judgment that accommodating [his] demands by releasing him 
into the open prison population or transferring him to a less secure facility would impair its ability to 
protect all who are inside the prison’s walls … [T]he [Bureau of Prisons] has had to strike a delicate 
balance between reducing the restrictions imposed on Mr. Silverstein … and its legitimate security 
concerns in ensuring the security of all who come in contact with Mr. Silverstein, as well as his own 
security, by keeping him in segregated confinement.  This is a considered choice for which we should not 
substitute our judgment.”); Talib v. Gilley. 138 F.3d 211 214 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding prison officials had 
a legitimate penological interest in requiring people in lockdown to kneel on the floor with their hands 
behind their backs before they were served meals in their cells.).  
 118. Wilson v. Seiter, 510 U.S. at 310 (White, J., concurring) (“Inhumane prison conditions often 
are the result of cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, 
sometimes over a long period of time.  In these circumstances, it is far from clear whose intent should be 
examined … In truth, intent is simply not very meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution 
such as a prison system.”) 
 119. Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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Posner added that, “[i]ndeed, like other famous oxymorons in law—
‘all deliberate speed’ for example, or ‘substantive due process’—it 
evades rather than expresses precise meaning.”120 
In light of these problems, scholars have suggested that deliberate 
indifference, or actual awareness, of risk of harm could be imputed to 
prison officials by a showing of the scientific evidence that actual harm 
exists.121  The Fourth Circuit took this approach in Porter v. Clarke, 
where it held that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the 
“substantial risk of serious psychological and emotional harm” from 
the long-term solitary confinement conditions of people on death row 
in Virginia.122  The court pointed to the “extensive scholarly literature 
describing and quantifying the adverse mental health effects of 
prolonged solitary confinement” as “evidence that the risk of such 
harm ‘was so obvious that it had to have been known.’”123  It agreed 
with the lower court’s finding that “it would defy logic” to suggest that 
prison officials were unaware of the potential harm that could be 
caused by lack of human interaction.124  Knowledge could also be 
imputed to prison officials in light of legislative findings in preambles 
to reform bills which expressly recognize the harm caused by solitary 
confinement.125  
An alternative to imputing knowledge to prison officials is simply 
to remove the subjective test altogether.126  Such an approach finds 
support in the concurring opinion in Rhodes, adopting the view that 
when determining whether prison conditions are cruel and unusual, the 
“touchstone is the effect upon the imprisoned.”127  The Rhodes 
concurrence cited Laaman v. Helgemoe, which held that when “the 
cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration threatens the 
physical, mental, and emotional health and well-being of the inmates 
and/or creates a probability of recidivism and future incarceration,” the 
conditions violate the Constitution.128  If the Eighth Amendment 
inquiry is focused on the effect of any given condition on the 
incarcerated person, then the mindset of officials would be irrelevant.  
To be sure, for such a test to be truly effective, the “totality of 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Christine Rebman, The Eighth Amendment and Solitary Confinement: The Gap in 
Protection from Psychological Consequences 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 618-19 (2000). 
 122. 923 F.3d 348, 364 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 123. Id. (quoting Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 136 (4th Cir. 2015)). 
 124. Id. (citing Porter v. Clarke, 290 F.Supp.3d 518, 532 (E.D. Va. 2018)). 
 125. See, e.g., Sen. Con. Res. 161, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2020). 
 126. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bennion, supra, note 27, at 773.  
 127. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 364 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Laaman v. 
Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977)). 
 128. Id. at 364. 
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conditions” rule would also require revision to reflect the realities of 
prison life.  The touchstone test might be criticized as opening the 
floodgates of litigation relating to prison conditions.  However, other 
barriers to Eighth Amendment challenges of prison conditions, 
discussed in the next Section, would prevent frivolous litigation.  In 
any event, the contours of the constitutional prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment should not be determined by concerns about 
courts’ workloads.129 
B. Barriers to Relief 
Limitations on filing and pursuing federal challenges to prison 
conditions present further difficulties for incarcerated people.  These 
limitations are particularly onerous on people in solitary confinement 
due to their isolation and vulnerability. 
1. Prison Litigation Reform Act    
Enacted in 1996, the PLRA imposed a set of barriers on incarcerated 
people that drastically limits their access to the federal courts.  The 
PLRA bars recovery of damages for mental and emotional harm 
without a prior showing of physical injury;130 limits actions by indigent 
people seeking to proceed in forma pauperis; and requires the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies before commencement of court 
proceedings.131  It also limits the scope of relief that courts can order 
when a violation of rights is established with respect to prison 
conditions.132 
i. Bar on Recovery for Mental and Emotional Injury 
One of the limitations created by the PLRA that is particularly 
problematic for people in solitary confinement is that imposed by 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which bars recovery for mental or emotional injury 
without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a 
sexual act.  The statute does not define “physical injury,” “mental 
injury,” or “emotional injury.”  
 
 129. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Perhaps judicial 
overload is an appropriate concern in determining whether statutory standing to sue should be conferred 
on certain plaintiffs …. But this inherently self-interest concern has no appropriate role in interpreting the 
contours of a substantive constitutional right.”). 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 3626. 
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The courts have held that § 1997e(e) does not preclude all remedies 
for mental and emotional injuries suffered while in custody; it merely 
bars compensatory damages.  In Zehner v. Trigg, the Seventh Circuit 
dismissed a claim for damages for mental and emotional injuries 
suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos insofar as it sought 
damages, because compensatory damages are not available under § 
1997e(e).133  The court conceded that an injunction was of little value 
to the plaintiffs because it could not “save them from the fear that they 
might one day become ill,” and “if these plaintiffs are to be 
compensated for that fear at all, it must be by damages.”134  However, 
Congress had decided that damages for such harm should not be 
awarded, and the court ruled that the statute was constitutional.135  
Other courts have indicated that nominal and punitive damages and 
declaratory relief are not barred by § 1997e(e).136 
Imposing an even greater obstacle to relief for people in solitary 
confinement, courts have held that physical injuries arising from 
psychological harm do not overcome the bar imposed by  
§ 1997e(e).137  In Davis v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit 
upheld the dismissal of a claim by a man whose HIV-positive status 
was disclosed to other incarcerated people without his consent.138  Mr. 
Davis claimed mental and emotional harm, and in addition, that he had 
suffered weight loss, loss of appetite, and insomnia after the 
unauthorized disclosure.  The court rejected the suggestion that these 
symptoms constituted a physical injury, holding that the statute 
required that physical injuries arise prior to the mental or emotional 
harm.139  In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the “statutory 
purpose of discouraging frivolous suits preclude[s] reliance on the 
somatic manifestations of emotional distress Davis alleges.”140 
Because proof of mental or emotional injury is not required to 
establish an Eighth Amendment violation, § 1997e(e) does not bar all 
challenges to solitary confinement.  In Waters v. Andrews, the District 
Court for the Western District of New York dismissed prison officials’ 
 
 133. 133 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 463. 
 136. See, e.g., Waters v. Andrews, 2000 WL 16111126 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2000) (citing Allah v. 
Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that § 1997e(e) did not bar First Amendment claim for 
punitive and nominal damages); Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting availability 
of injunctive relief for constitutional challenge to prison regulation), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 594 (1999)). 
 137. See, e.g., Davis v District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Todd v. Graves, 217 
F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (S.D. Iowa 2002); Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 138. 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 139. Id. at 1349. 
 140. Id. 
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application for summary judgment on this basis.141  Moreover, the 
court held that there was a question of material fact as to whether 
conditions in solitary confinement constituted a “physical injury” so 
as to overcome the bar imposed by § 1997e(e).142  The plaintiff in 
Waters had been strip-searched, placed in an isolation cell, and given 
a thin, translucent paper gown which did not fully conceal her body.143  
She had no undergarments, personal hygiene items, toilet paper, or a 
replacement gown, and her request for a shower was denied.144  The 
cell was dirty, and the mattress was blood-stained and smelled of 
urine.145  The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that 
exposure to noxious body odors and “dreadful conditions of 
confinement” amounted to physical injury.146 
ii. Exhaustion of Remedies 
Another burdensome component of the PLRA is the requirement in 
§ 1997e(a) that all available administrative remedies be exhausted 
before challenging prison conditions in federal court.  Prior to the 
enactment of this provision, courts could stay actions brought by 
incarcerated people for up to 180 days while “plain, speedy, and 
effective administrative remedies” were exhausted.147  The PLRA 
“invigorated the exhaustion prescription” by mandating exhaustion of 
all available remedies and removing the requirement that such 
remedies be plain, speedy, or effective.148 
The exhaustion requirement “invites technical mistakes resulting in 
inadvertent non-compliance . . . and bar[s] litigants from court because 
of their ignorance and uncounseled procedural errors.”149  Given the 
complexity of administrative processes, incarcerated people are 
certainly not encouraged to pursue them. Indeed, by doing so, they face 
the risk of retaliation which in turn can result in their spending more 
time in solitary confinement.150 
 
 141. 2000 WL 16111126 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). 
        142.   Id. at *1.   
 143. Id. at *2. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at *8. 
 147. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 352 (1980), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e (1994 ed.). 
 148. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). 
 149. John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 BROOK. 
L. REV. 429, 431 (2001). 
 150. John Boston, supra, note 149, at 429, n. 7 (“One of the dirty secrets of American corrections 
is the persistence of secret threats and retaliation against prisoners who complain about their treatment, 
including those who use the grievance systems that the PLRA has now made mandatory.  Despite the 
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iii. Actions in Forma Pauperis  
The PLRA limits the extent to which indigent people in prison can 
pursue litigation without paying filing fees.  Unlike most plaintiffs, 
incarcerated people who are granted in forma pauperis status are not 
exempt from paying court fees.151  The PLRA instead imposes on them 
partial payment obligations calculated with reference to the balance in 
their prison accounts.152 Court costs cannot be discharged in 
bankruptcy.153  Such restrictions affect all incarcerated people, but they 
are especially burdensome for people in solitary confinement who are 
seldom able to get prison jobs.154   
The PLRA imposes a three-strikes provision which prohibits 
incarcerated people from bringing lawsuits in forma pauperis if they 
have already brought three actions or appeals that have been dismissed 
for being frivolous or malicious or failing to state a claim.155  Dismissal 
on any of these grounds, even if an appeal of the dismissal is pending, 
counts as a strike.156  It is uncertain whether failure to exhaust all 
administrative remedies counts as a strike; courts have arrived at 
different conclusions given the opacity of internal administrative 
procedures.157 The resulting confusion comes at the expense of 
incarcerated people, who must decide whether to risk pursuing 
litigation and accruing a strike in the absence of any clear guidance. 
iv. Narrowly Drawn Relief  
The PLRA limits the relief that federal courts can grant in civil 
actions relating to prison conditions so that relief must be narrowly 
drawn and extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of 
the right.158  The relief must be the least intrusive means necessary to 
correct the violation, and courts are required to give substantial weight 
to “any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal 
 
enormous difficulty of proving this kind of claim, there is a steady stream of court and jury findings 
documenting such actions.”).  
 151. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) and (2). 
 152. Id. 
 153. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(17). 
 154. John Boston, supra, note 149, at 433. 
 155. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
 156. Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 135 S.Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015). 
 157. Anderson v. Jutzy, 175 F. Supp. 3d 781 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (holding that failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies did not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); but see White v. Lemma, 
947 F.3d 1373 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding prisoner had accrued a “strike” for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies). 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 
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justice system” that might result from the relief.159  Thus, not only do 
the federal courts afford deference to prison officials during the course 
of litigation in determining whether there was a violation, but they 
must also defer to officials’ judgments about safety and operational 
matters when determining the scope of relief. 
This provision limits not only preliminary injunctive relief but also 
settlements and consent decrees.  If a court decides to make a release 
order, the statute requires that a three-judge panel be convened.160 The 
panel must be satisfied that a release order is necessary because 
overcrowding is the primary cause of the violation, and no other relief 
will remedy the violation.161  No release order can be made unless the 
court has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has 
failed to remedy the violation, and the department of corrections has 
had a reasonable amount of time to comply with that prior order.162 
In Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court upheld such an order in a five-
four decision.163  That case concerned overcrowding in California’s 
prisons, which had operated at nearly 200% capacity for over eleven 
years.164  A three-judge panel ordered the state to reduce the prison 
population to 137.5% of the prisons’ capacity.  Describing the 
overcrowding in the state’s prisons as “exceptional,” a majority of the 
Supreme Court affirmed the reduction order, observing that people 
were “crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended” to house 
them.165  The order was made after the governor had already declared 
a state of emergency in the prisons, and it followed previous failures 
to comply with remedial orders entered by the district court to address 
Eighth Amendment violations.166  While the order required the state to 
reduce capacity to 137.5% within two years, the state submitted a 
proposed plan that would achieve the required reduction over five 
years.167  This proposal was rejected, although the Supreme Court 
suggested that the three-judge panel give “serious consideration” to 
other modifications proposed by the state.168 
The Plata litigation encapsulates the ways in which federal 
jurisprudence and statutes combine to prolong challenges to prison 
conditions and ultimately delay meaningful improvements for as long 
 
 159. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 
 160. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(C). 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E). 
 162. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A). 
 163. 563 U.S. 493 (2011). 
 164. Id. at 502. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 529. 
 167. Id. at 541. 
 168. Id. at 544. 
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as possible. 
2. Qualified Immunity 
Qualified immunity presents another barrier to meaningful relief for 
people seeking to hold prison officials accountable for constitutional 
violations.  If it is raised by prison officials prior to trial, the burden 
then shifts to the prisoner to establish lack of immunity.169  The 
qualified immunity test imposes a “heavy two-part burden.”170 
A recent Supreme Court decision illustrates the application of 
qualified immunity in a case concerning conditions of confinement.  In 
Taylor v. Riojas, the Court overturned a Fifth Circuit decision granting 
qualified immunity to prison officials who placed a man in “a pair of 
shockingly unsanitary cells.”171  One of the cells was covered in human 
feces and the other was “frigidly cold . . . [and] equipped with only a 
clogged drain in the floor to dispose of body wastes.”172  Mr. Taylor 
was forced to sleep naked on the floor, which was covered in 
sewage.173   
In the Fifth Circuit, the court explained that, to overcome the 
qualified immunity defense, Mr. Taylor had to show, first, that the 
officials violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment, and second, that this right was clearly established at the 
time of the violation.174  The court found that the first part of the test 
had been met given the “paltry conditions” of the cells which exposed 
him to a substantial risk of harm and denied him a minimal civilized 
measure of life’s necessities.175  Nevertheless, the court found that Mr. 
Taylor failed on the second part because the right to be exempt from 
such conditions was not clearly established at the time of the 
violation.176  The court reasoned that “Taylor stayed in his extremely 
dirty cell for only six days.  Though the law was clear that prisoners 
couldn’t be housed in cells teeming with human waste for months on 
end . . . we hadn’t previously held that a time period so short violated 
the Constitution.”177 The Fifth Circuit held that the prison officials 
were entitled to qualified immunity because the lack of established 
 
 169. Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 170. Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Casey v. W. Las Vegas 
Indep. School Dist., 473 1323, 1327 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 171. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52 (2020). 
 172. Id. at 53. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 175. Id. at 222. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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precedent had deprived them of fair warning that the specific acts were 
unconstitutional.178  
The Supreme Court disagreed.  It held that “no reasonable 
correctional officer could have concluded that, under the extreme 
circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house 
Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended 
period of time.”179  It went on to state that “any reasonable officer 
should have realized that Taylor’s conditions of confinement offended 
the Constitution.”180  In so reasoning, the Court rejected the Fifth 
Circuit’s reliance on the specific period of time in which Mr. Taylor 
was held in these conditions as the basis for granting qualified 
immunity and focused instead on the egregious conditions in which he 
was held.  Taylor is significant because it signals a move away from 
the practice adopted by federal courts to date of requiring specific, 
similar facts—here, the precise period of confinement in squalid 
conditions—in order to give rise to a clearly established right. 
In cases concerning solitary confinement that do not involve quite 
the same appalling conditions to which Mr. Taylor was subjected, it 
remains to be seen whether the requirement of a “clearly established 
right” will continue to favor prison officials.  To date, courts have 
imposed a high standard to show that a right is clearly established.  For 
example, in Grissom v. Roberts, the Tenth Circuit granted qualified 
immunity to prison officials in a case involving a man who had been 
in solitary confinement for twenty years.181  Although Mr. Grissom 
cited four federal cases that recognized that the harm of long-term 
solitary confinement could violate the Eighth Amendment, the court 
held these cases were insufficient to show a “clearly established right” 
because none of them were decided by the Tenth Circuit or the 
Supreme Court.182 
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND JURISPRUDENCE 
Though many state courts have followed federal jurisprudence, state 
constitutional provisions and judgments nevertheless provide 
alternative avenues for challenging solitary confinement. While 
scholars have examined the jurisprudence of particular states regarding 
individual rights, and some have discussed the state constitutional 
rights of incarcerated people, there has been less attention paid to the 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020). 
 180. Id. at 54. 
 181. 902 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 182. Id. at 1174. 
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potential these rights offer for challenges to solitary confinement.183   
A. The Role of State Courts 
In 1973, Ohio’s Eighth District Court of Appeals recognized that 
state courts serve an important function in articulating the rights of 
incarcerated people.  In In Re Lamb, the court held that placing 
incarcerated people in “punitive detention” (a form of solitary 
confinement) violated the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.184 The court 
observed that “primary responsibility for the delineation of prisoners’ 
rights in state and local custodial institutions ought properly to fall 
upon the state judiciary.”185 The court went on to explain that: 
[I]t is both eminently sensible and infinitely less strain on the delicate 
balance of federal-state relations in the administration of our federal system 
of criminal justice to posit such primary responsibility on the state 
judiciary.  Rather than viewing the state judicial system as a delaying but 
necessary obstacle to be overcome in the exhaustion of state remedies 
before the consideration of federal constitutional questions is undertaken 
in the federal courts, . . . it is especially important that both prisoners and 
prison administrators recognize that the conflict between prison 
disciplinary action and prisoners’ constitutional rights will receive careful 
scrutiny in the first instance at the state, as well as the federal level.186 
The court characterized “the failure of the state courts to come to grips 
with problems in their own custodial institutions” as “astonishing.”187  
Due to their role in sentencing, state courts “cannot evade their 
continuing responsibility to protect [prisoners’] basic rights after 
conviction.”188  Although the court did not conduct separate analyses 
 
 183. See, e.g., Richard P. Bullock, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974: 
The Louisiana Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 51 LA. L. REV. 787 (1991); Matthew Clifford & 
Thomas Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of Montana’s “Dignity” Clause with Possible 
Applications, 61 MONT. L. REV. 301 (2000); Caroline Davidson, State Constitutions and the Humane 
Treatment of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1 (2014); Lee Hargrave, The 
Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35  LA. L. REV. 1 (1974); David C. Hawkins, 
Florida Constitutional Law: 1990 Survey of the State Bill of Rights, 15 NOVA. L. REV. 1049 (1991); Linda 
Hemphill, Challenging Conditions of Confinement: A State Constitutional Approach, 20 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 409 (1984); Robert Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 21 LAND & WATER 
L. REV. 527 (1986); Louis Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 LOY. L. REV. 9 (1975); Robert W. 
Lough, Tennessee Constitutional Standards for Conditions of Pretrial Detention: A Mandate for Jail 
Reform, 48 TENN. L. REV. 688 (1981); James G. McLaren, The Meaning of the Unnecessary Rigor 
Provision in the Utah Constitution, 10 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 27 (1996). 
 184. 296 N.E. 2d 280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973). 
 185. Id. at 285. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 284-285. 
 188. Id. at 285. 
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of the state and federal provisions that were allegedly violated, it 
concluded that the petitioners had been illegally held in solitary 
confinement in violation of both the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions.189 
The Ohio court’s recognition of the need for state courts to take 
“primary responsibility” for defining the constitutional rights of 
incarcerated people has been recognized elsewhere.  In 1977, Justice 
Brennan wrote that “state courts cannot rest when they have afforded 
their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution.  State 
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections 
often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of federal law.”190 Justice Brennan suggested that state 
courts were increasingly “construing state constitutional counterparts 
of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing . . . even more 
protection than the federal provisions, even those identically 
phrased.”191  He linked state courts’ expanding recognition of these 
rights with the Supreme Court’s turn away from protecting individual 
rights.192  In Justice Brennan’s view, the Supreme Court’s decisions on 
individual rights are not “mechanically applicable to state law issues, 
and state court judges and the members of the bar seriously err if they 
so treat them.”193 
In line with Justice Brennan’s comments, many state courts have 
recognized that their constitutions need not be interpreted in the same 
manner as the Federal Constitution.  In State v. Rizzo, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court held that the state’s constitution may offer greater 
protection of individual rights than the Federal Constitution, subject to 
six factors: (1) persuasive federal precedents, (2) the text of the 
relevant provision of the state constitution, (3) the intent of the drafters 
of the constitution, (4) related state precedents, (5) persuasive 
precedents from other state courts, and (6) current understanding of 
economic and sociological norms or public policies.194 The 
Washington Supreme Court also looks to textual differences and 
 
 189. Id. at 288. 
 190. William J. Brennan, Jr., supra note 1, at 491.  See also Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg 
County, 630 P.2d 772, 779 (Okla. 1981) (quoting Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 345-346 (1965) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) “None can view with satisfaction the channeling of a large part of state criminal 
business to federal trial courts.  If adequate state procedures, presently all too scarce, were generally 
adopted, much would be done to remove the irritant of participation by federal district courts in state 
criminal procedure.”)  The court in Prock observed that “This observation is equally apropos with respect 
to prison discipline cases.  Judicial lethargy is unlikely to help the state solve whatever problems may still 
exist in its penal system.” Id.  
 191. Id. at 495. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 502. 
 194. State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363, 391 (Conn. 2003) (citing City Recycling, Inc. v. State, 778 A.2d 
77 (Conn. 2001)). 
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matters of particular state interest in ruling on the scope of 
constitutional protections.195 These approaches give state courts ample 
latitude to interpret state constitutions to improve conditions in solitary 
confinement, or even restrict or eliminate the practice altogether. 
B. Prohibitions of Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Forty-seven state constitutions contain some form of prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.196  Some courts have held that 
state provisions offer greater protection than the Eighth Amendment, 
though the parameters are rarely specified with precision.  In other 
cases, state courts have simply adopted the federal two-part test 
applied in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
1. State Provisions that Differ from the Eighth Amendment 
The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that “the language of 
each provision of the Constitution must be treated with particular 
deference, as though every word had been hammered into place.”197  
Presumably other state courts apply the same attention to the wording 
of their own constitutions.  Nevertheless, most of the states whose 
constitutions are worded differently from the Eighth Amendment have 
not actually reached decisions concerning the rights of incarcerated 
people that differ from those of the federal courts.   
Louisiana’s Constitution prohibits laws that subject any person to 
“torture . . . , cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.”198  
Interpretations of this provision have largely focused on the meaning 
of “excessive punishment,” which is broader than the prohibition on 
“excessive fines” in Louisiana’s previous constitution.199 In State v.  
Sepulvado, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that “the deliberate 
inclusion of a prohibition against ‘excessive’ as well as ‘cruel and 
unusual’ punishment adds an additional constitutional dimension to 
 
 195. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986) (the court considers “(1) the textual 
language; (2) differences in the text; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural 
differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern.”). 
 196. State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 636, n.5 (Utah 1997) (“A prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment appears in forty-four of the fifty state constitutions as well as the Constitution of the United 
States, and similar prohibitions appear in three others . . . Only the constitutions of Connecticut, Illinois, 
and Vermont do not contain a guarantee that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.”). 
 197. City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend ex rel. Dept. of Redevelopment, 744 
N.E. 2d 443 (Ind. 2001) (quoting McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2000) (Dickson, J., 
dissenting)). 
 198. LA. CONST., art. I, § 20. 
 199. LA. CONST., art. I, § 12 (1921). 
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judicial imposition and review of sentences.”200  Louisiana courts have 
reviewed sentences for alleged excessiveness since Sepulvado.201 
Though Louisiana’s prohibition of torture has not been tested in any 
challenge to solitary confinement, that provision is more relevant to 
the practice than the excessive sentences the courts did review.  The 
reference to torture was new to the 1974 constitution. Its predecessor 
prohibited only “treatment designed . . . to compel confession of 
crime.”202  The current constitution was initially drafted to prohibit 
“cruel, unusual or excessive treatments” but the word “treatments” 
was removed “not because of any concern related to questioning 
procedures or punishment but because of fear that it might be 
construed as preventing physicians from using novel or unusual 
methods.”203  A member of the Louisiana House of Representatives 
wrote in 1975 that the prohibition against torture “outlaws virtually all 
forms of corporal punishment and treatment . . . Clearly this forbids 
some methods of administering the death penalty, long periods of 
confinement in isolation, highly restrictive diets, forced administration 
of drugs and, of course, physical abuse of all sorts.”204 Nevertheless, 
there has been no holding by a court that solitary confinement violates 
the prohibition against torture under the Louisiana Constitution. 
In the Maryland Constitution, the relevant provision is entitled 
“Avoidance of . . . Cruel and Unusual Punishment,” but the provision 
itself states that “no Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and 
penalties ought to be made.”205  Despite the different wording, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held in Walker v. State that the 
Eighth Amendment and the state provision are in pari materia because 
“both of them were taken virtually verbatim from the English Bill of 
Rights of 1689.”206  The court has not addressed whether the phrase 
“pains and penalties” could be interpreted differently from the federal 
courts’ restrictive definition of the word “punishment.”  The fact that 
both provisions derive from the same source should not preclude a 
different interpretation of Maryland’s provision, particularly because 
the English provision sought to prohibit punishments not authorized 
 
 200. 367 So. 2d 762, 764 (La. 1979). 
 201. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992) (holding death penalty for person found 
guilty but mentally ill not constitutionally excessive); State v. Hamdalla, 126 So.3d 19 (La. 2013) (holding 
sentence of eighty years at hard labor for rape conviction not constitutionally excessive). 
 202. LA. CONST., art. I, § 11 (1921). 
 203. Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 
1, 63 (1974), citing Committee Proposal 25, § 18 in Calendar of the Constitutional Convention of 1973 
of the State of Louisiana (emphasis added). 
 204. Louis Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 LOY. L. REV. 9, 38-39 (1975). 
 205. MD. CONST. art. 16 (emphasis added). 
 206. 452 A.2d 1234, 1240 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982). 
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by statute or the sentencing judge.  In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court 
discarded this requirement through its narrow definition of the word 
“punishment.”  
New Hampshire’s Constitution does not explicitly prohibit cruel and 
unusual punishment.  It provides that “all penalties ought to be 
proportioned to the nature of the offense . . . Where the same 
undistinguishing severity is exerted against all offenses, the people are 
led to forget the real distinction in the crimes themselves.”207  In 
interpreting the provision, the courts have focused on proportionality 
between the offense and the sentence, rather than the character of the 
punishment.  In State v. Enderson, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire held that the provision “provides at least as much 
protection against disproportionate punishment as does the Eighth 
Amendment.”208  The court determined in State v. Dayutis that the 
Federal Constitution need only be addressed “insofar as federal law 
would provide greater protection.”209  In that case, a sentence was held 
to be disproportionate and violate the state constitution, and 
consequently, the court did not address the federal prohibition.210  The 
state’s constitutional provision has not been invoked in any challenge 
to conditions of confinement, although such conditions also raise the 
question of proportionality. 
South Carolina’s Constitution states that neither “cruel, nor 
corporal, nor unusual punishment” shall be inflicted.211  However, the 
courts have never interpreted that provision differently from the Eighth 
Amendment and there are few cases in which both the Eighth 
Amendment and the state prohibition were considered.212  The lack of 
case law on the subject is unfortunate because the wording which 
places the three prohibitions—cruel, corporal, and unusual—on the 
same footing may suggest a broader interpretation of the term “cruel 
and unusual” to include forms of punishment other than corporal, such 
as oppressive conditions.  
Examination of these textual differences between the Eighth 
Amendment and state constitutional provisions relating to cruel and 
unusual punishment may allow for a closer alignment of court 
decisions with state constitutions’ intended purposes and provide for 
 
 207. N.H. CONST. art. 18th. 
 208. 804 A.2d 448 (N.H. 2002). 
 209. 498 A.2d 325, 328 (N.H. 1985) (citing State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 351 (N.H. 1983)). 
 210. Id. at 329. 
 211. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 212. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 413 S.E.2d 19 (S.C. 1992) (“the use of the disjunctive ‘or’ rather 
than ‘and’ in the South Carolina Constitution is of no importance in this case, since the analysis we employ 
is the same under both constitutions.”). 
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different interpretations regarding the constitutionality of solitary 
confinement. 
2. State Provisions that Resemble the Eighth Amendment 
Paradoxically, some states with provisions similar to the Eighth 
Amendment have interpreted   their constitutions as conferring broader 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment than the federal 
provision. 
In California, broader protection was accomplished through 
emphasis on a small difference in wording.  The state constitution 
prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment,” in contrast to the federal 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”213  In People v. 
Anderson, the  Supreme Court of California held that the death penalty 
violated the state constitution and noted that the drafters of the 
prohibition “modified [it] before adoption to substitute the disjunctive 
‘or’ for the conjunctive ‘and’ in order to establish their intent that both 
cruel and unusual punishments be outlawed in [the] state.”214  
Likewise, a California appellate court has held that California’s 
provision provides greater protection by prohibiting cruel or unusual 
punishment.215  As a result, the courts separately assess violations of 
the state and federal prohibitions.216  Nevertheless, the courts have 
never found that a punishment violates the state constitution but not 
the Federal Constitution.217 A different interpretation of the state 
prohibition is precluded by a separate constitutional provision that 
states that while the rights guaranteed by the state constitution are not 
dependent on those guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, the right 
not to suffer cruel or unusual punishment (as well as other rights 
relating to criminal procedure) “shall be construed by the courts of this 
State in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United 
States.”218 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court signaled in Michaud v. 
Sheriff of Essex Cty that the rights guaranteed under the state 
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishments are “at least equally 
as broad as those guaranteed under the Eighth Amendment.”219  The 
 
 213. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 214. 493 P.2d 880, 885 (Cal. 1972). 
 215. People v. Haller, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
 216. People v. Baker, 229 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
 217. In People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972), the court held that the death penalty violated 
the state prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and thus the court did not need to consider 
whether it violated the Federal Constitution. 
 218. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
 219. 458 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Mass. 1983). 
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court affirmed an order holding that unsanitary conditions in a local 
jail violated both the Eighth Amendment and the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  The evidence before the court established that 
the jail’s cells did not have flushing toilets or running water.  Instead, 
one bucket (with no lid) was provided for each cell, including those 
that housed more than one person.220  The buckets were only emptied 
once per day, rinsed with cold water, and the odor was described as 
“unbearable.”221  People confined in the cells ate their meals and slept 
near the unemptied buckets.222  The court discussed federal decisions 
holding that similar conditions violated the Eighth Amendment but 
went on to acknowledge that these cases were not the sole basis for 
determining whether the jail’s conditions violated standards of human 
decency.223  The court held that state regulations imposing “minimum 
standards of human habitation in prisons” also provided “an objective 
standard for assessing whether sanitary conditions at the jail fall below 
minimum standards of decency.”224 
The view that the state constitutional provision is broader than its 
federal counterpart was also adopted by an appellate court in Michigan 
in People v. Benton, though the issue was tested under the state 
constitution first.  The court held that if a punishment “passes muster 
under the state constitution, then it necessarily passes muster under the 
Federal Constitution.”225 Michigan’s provision, like those of 
California and Massachusetts, prohibits “cruel or unusual 
punishments.”226   
Minnesota’s Constitution also prohibits “cruel or unusual 
punishments.”227  In State v. Vang, the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that the difference in language from the Eighth Amendment is “not 
trivial.”228  In contrast with the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme 
 
 220. Id. at 703-704. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 705-706 (citing Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1291–1292 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Boles v. Chavis, 454 U.S. 907 (1981); Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 586–587 (4th Cir. 1976); 
LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878; Lovell v. Brennan, 
566 F. Supp. 672, 695–696 (D. Me. 1983); Griffin v. DeRobertis, 557 F. Supp. 302, 305–306 
(N.D.Ill.1983); Strachan v. Ashe, 548 F. Supp. 1193, 1202–1203 (D. Mass. 1982); Flakes v. Percy, 511 
F. Supp. 1325, 1332 (W. D. Wis. 1981); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 894 (N. D. Fla. 1976); 
Bel v. Hall, 392 F. Supp. 274, 276–277 (D. Mass. 1975); Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (D. 
Conn. 1973)). 
 224. Id. at 706-707. 
 225. 817 N.W.2d 599, 607 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (citing People v. Nunez, 619 N.W. 2d 550 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2000)). 
 226. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added). 
 227. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (emphasis added). 
 228. 847 N.W. 2d 248, 263 (Minn. 2014). 
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Court, the court in Vang conducted separate analyses of whether the 
sentence was cruel or unusual.  It first held that the question of cruelty 
required a comparison of the gravity of the offense with the severity of 
the sentence.229  Next, it considered whether the sentence was unusual 
by asking whether “a consensus exists among the states that the 
sentence offends evolving standards of decency.”230  A finding that a 
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was neither cruel nor unusual 
led the court to conclude that there was no violation of the state 
constitution or the Eighth Amendment.231 
The Constitution of Washington prohibits “cruel punishment” with 
no reference to unusual punishment.232  Nevertheless, this provision 
has been held to provide more protection than the Eighth Amendment.  
In State v. Witherspoon, the Washington Supreme Court reasoned that 
if a sentence did not violate the “more protective state provision,” no 
analysis of the Eighth Amendment was required.233 
New York’s constitutional provision is identical to the Eighth 
Amendment.234  However, the two constitutions were still analyzed 
separately in a decision by a lower court in a case challenging the 
capital punishment statute then in effect.235  In People v. Hale, the 
court first conducted “an interpretive analysis of the constitutional 
provision in question, focusing on whether the text of the state 
constitution specifically recognize[d] rights not enumerated in the 
Federal Constitution.”236  Because the provisions are identical, the 
court found no reason to interpret the state prohibition differently from 
the Eighth Amendment.237  That conclusion was followed by a “non-
interpretive” analysis, requiring “judicial perception of sound policy, 
justice and fundamental fairness.”238  It explored whether any state 
statute or the common law had defined the right at issue, the history 
and traditions of the state, evidence that the right was of particular state 
concern, and state attitudes toward the definition, scope, or protection 
of the right.239  The court’s non-interpretive analysis also required a 
review of the state’s historical use of the death penalty.  The conclusion 
 
 229. Id. (citing State v. Juarez, 837 N.W. 2d 473, 482 (Minn. 2013)). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.  
 232. WASH CONST. art. I, § 14. 
 233. 329 P.3d 888, 894 (Wash. 2014) (citing State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1996) and State 
v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720 (Wash. 1980)). 
 234. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 235. People v. Hale, 661 N.Y.S. 2d 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). 
 236. Id. at 472. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. (citing People v. P.J. Video, 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1986)). 
 239. Id. 
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reached, informed by “New York’s contemporary values,” was that the 
death penalty did not violate the state constitution.240 
Tennessee’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is 
also identical to the Eighth Amendment, but the courts have indicated 
that the state provision may have broader meaning.241  In State v. 
Black, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a “more expansive” 
interpretation of the state provision was not foreclosed merely because 
the two provisions are “textually parallel.”242  However, after analysis 
of the death penalty under the state constitution, the court reached a 
result consistent with decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and some 
other state courts, finding that the death penalty did not violate the state 
constitution.243 
Though there has not been a finding to date that solitary confinement 
is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of a state constitution, the 
state courts’ broader interpretations of state constitutions with 
language similar to the Eighth Amendment may permit a challenge to 
the practice in the future.  Moreover, some state statutes provide that 
solitary confinement may only be used for the limited purposes of 
punishment or protection of vulnerable people.244  State courts might 
also draw on these provisions to inform the interpretation of 
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. 
C. Requirement of Safe and Comfortable Prisons and Humane 
Treatment 
In contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the 
Federal Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,”245 
Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Wyoming all have constitutional 
provisions requiring safe and comfortable prisons and/or the humane 
treatment of people in prison.246   
 
 240. Id. at 473. 
 241. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 242. 815 S.W. 2d 166, 188 (Tenn. 1991) (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 50, 108 
(1988); California v. Ramos, 436 U.S. 992, 1013-1014 (1983); Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W. 2d 834, 838 
(Tenn. 1988); Miller v. State, 584 S.W. 2d 758, 760 (Tenn. 1978)). 
 243. Id. 
 244. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.271 (West 1983) (“Facilities shall confine more than one person 
in each cell or room except as strictly necessary for the purposes of punishment or the protection of specific 
prisoners.”) (Emphasis added). 
 245. Rhodes, 452 U.S. 347 (1981). 
 246. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“. . . in the construction of jails a proper regard shall be had to the 
health of prisoners”); KY. CONST. § 254 (“The Commonwealth shall maintain control of the discipline, 
and provide for all supplies, and for the sanitary condition of the convicts . . .”); TENN. CONST. art I, § 32 
(“That the erection of prisons, the inspection of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners, shall be 
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The only substantive case law to discuss any of these provisions is 
a federal court decision from Tennessee.  In Grubbs v. Bradley, a 
federal district court held that Tennessee’s provision requiring the 
humane treatment of incarcerated people did not provide any 
protection beyond that available under the Eighth Amendment.247  The 
court determined that the well-established principle, that incarcerated 
people must have their basic needs met in accordance with evolving 
standards of decency, was equivalent to the Tennessee provision.248  
This reasoning, however, failed to consider that Tennessee’s 
Constitution has a separate provision prohibiting cruel and unusual 
punishment so that, taken together, the two provisions support broader 
rights than are afforded by the Eighth Amendment.  Furthermore, 
although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment 
does not permit inhumane conditions, such conditions are deemed to 
violate the Constitution only if they satisfy the two-part test of a 
sufficiently serious deprivation and deliberate indifference.249  There 
is no justification for this test to determine the parameters of a separate 
provision that calls for the humane treatment of incarcerated people.  
Other courts have recognized a requirement to provide humane 
treatment even in the absence of a constitutional provision like 
Tennessee’s.  In 1860, the Michigan Supreme Court implicitly 
recognized such a right in a case involving the civil confinement of a 
man in jail for failure to pay a debt.250  The court declared the 
conditions to be solitary confinement and observed that people in the 
jail who had been charged with crimes were treated with less severity 
than this debtor.251  While finding that the sheriff of the jail had 
discretion regarding the treatment of people confined for both criminal 
and civil offenses, the court held that the discretion was not unlimited.  
The sheriff’s treatment of the man was both illegal and “contrary to 
every sentiment of justice and humanity.”252  It is uncertain whether 
the court would have reached this conclusion, however, if the man had 
been incarcerated for a criminal offense rather than failure to pay a 
debt. 
 
provided for”); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“. . . The erection of safe and comfortable prisons, and inspection 
of prisons, and the humane treatment of prisoners shall be provided for”). 
 247. 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). 
 248. Id. at 1125. 
 249. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 847 (holding that prison officials may be liable under the 
Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if they know that the conditions 
present a substantial risk of harm and they disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 
abate it). 
 250. Leah v. Whitbeck, 151 Mich. 327 (1908). 
 251. Id. at 335. 
 252. Id. at 336. 
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Though the provision of safe and comfortable prisons and humane 
treatment might appear to be enhanced by explicit constitutional 
language, jurisdictions without these provisions have honored the 
same obligations by interpreting standards of decency with reference 
to statutes.  In Good v. Comm’r of Corr., a case involving a claim that 
a prison’s water supply was contaminated with carcinogens, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted constitutional 
standards with reference to regulations concerning the quality of 
drinking water.253 Although those regulations were not 
“constitutionally required,” the court held that “they reflect the public 
attitude that contemporary society’s standards of decency include the 
availability of safe drinking water.”254 
Like Massachusetts, Wisconsin’s Constitution does not contain a 
provision requiring humane treatment of incarcerated people.  
However, prison wardens, superintendents and officials are required 
by statute to “uniformly treat the inmates with kindness.”255  The 
courts have held that this provision, which is entitled “humane 
treatment and punishment,” does not create a private right of action, 
but merely authorizes various state regulations.  It has not been used 
successfully in any challenge to prison conditions.256 
To date, no challenge to solitary confinement has been brought in 
any of the jurisdictions with a constitutional provision requiring safe 
and comfortable prisons or humane treatment.  Nevertheless, given the 
evidence of harm from solitary confinement, these rights offer a 
different basis for challenging the practice. 
D. Requirement of Reformation and Rehabilitation 
Seven state constitutions refer explicitly to reformation or 
rehabilitation as principles of criminal law and administration.257  
Courts have considered the right to rehabilitation in challenges to 
prison sentences and in relation to the provision of programs and 
education in prison. 
The right to rehabilitation has been construed narrowly in challenges 
to the length of sentences.  While the Indiana Supreme Court held in 
Fointno v. State that the criminal justice system “must afford an 
 
 253. 629 N.E.2d 1321, 1323 (Mass. 1994). 
 254. Id. 
 255. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 302.08. 
 256. See, e.g., Lobley v. Yang, 2019 WL 136693 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 8, 2019). 
 257. ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 12; ILL. CONST., art. I, § 11; IND. CONST., art. I, § 18; MONT. CONST. 
art. II, § 28; N.H. CONST., pt. 1, art. 18th; OR. CONST., art. I, § 15; WYO. CONST., art. I, § 15. 
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opportunity for rehabilitation where reasonably possible,”258 in 
Henson v. State it concluded that the reformation clause applies to the 
penal code as a whole and provides no basis for challenging the 
duration of sentences.259  Though the issue has not been litigated, 
presumably the same reasoning would extend to challenges to 
conditions of confinement that result from those sentences.   
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that the state’s reformation 
clause260 requires that rehabilitation be considered as one objective of 
sentencing; it will not suffice simply to consider “rehabilitative factors 
in imposing a sentence.”261  In People v. Wendt, the court upheld a 
sentence of probation to run consecutively with a prison sentence, 
holding that to prevent this approach would “unnecessarily restrict 
courts in fashioning a sentence that is aimed at rehabilitat[ion].”262  In 
People v. Thompson, the court held that a defendant’s potential for 
rehabilitation should not be accorded greater weight at sentencing than 
the seriousness of the offense.263 This approach suggests that 
rehabilitation is regarded as one of many factors to be balanced, rather 
than an objective of the sentence. 
In four states, the right to rehabilitation has informed interpretations 
regarding prison programs.  In State v. Evans, the Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire held that the “recognition of rehabilitation as a goal 
of confinement does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that inmates 
have a right to rehabilitation.”264  The court overturned an order by a 
lower court that directed a prison warden to develop a plan for state-
funded college-level programs at the prison.  Adopting the same 
deferential approach to prison administrators as the federal courts, it 
held that the judiciary is “ill-suited to assume the responsibilities of 
prison administration.”265 
The Oregon Court of Appeals described the reformation clause then 
in effect as “significant as a hortative philosophical base for Oregon’s 
penal code and correctional programs.”266  The court went on to state 
that, absent “extraordinary circumstances of cruel and unusual 
 
 258. 487 N.E.2d 140, 144 (Ind. 1986). 
 259. 707 N.E.2d 792, 796 (Ind. 1999). 
 260. ILL. CONST., art. I, § 11 (“All penalties shall be determined according to the seriousness of the 
offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 261. People v. Wendt, 645 N.E.2d 179 (Ill. 1994). 
 262. Id. at 184. 
 263. 168 N.E.3d 934, 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). 
 264. 127 N.H. 501, 504 (1985). 
 265. Id. (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 1807, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 
(1974); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 561 F.2d 411, 417 (1st Cir.1977); Breedlove v. Cripe, 511 F. Supp. 467, 
469 (N.D.Tex.1981)). 
 266. Kent v. Cupp, 554 P.2d 196, 198 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). 
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punishment,” the judiciary did not have authority to require 
implementation of rehabilitation programs.267  As well as recognizing 
the principle of reformation, Oregon’s Constitution requires that all 
incarcerated people be “actively engaged full-time in work or on-the-
job training,” with certain exceptions.268  However, this separate 
provision does not provide “a legally enforceable right to a job or to 
otherwise participate in work, on-the-job training or educational 
programs,” 269 and the clause is focused on generating income for 
prisons rather than addressing the rehabilitative needs of incarcerated 
people. 
On the other hand, Alaska’s reformation clause has been held to 
create an affirmative right to rehabilitation.270  In Ferguson v. State, 
Dep’t of Corr., the Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that the 
constitutional reference to reformation is “not a meaningless 
guarantee; rather, it creates a right to rehabilitation.”271  Therefore, a 
plaintiff who had been excluded from a prison rehabilitation program 
could not be barred from the program without due process.272  In 
Rathke v. Corr. Corp. of Am., Inc., the court reiterated that holding.273  
The Rathke case involved a man who lost his prison job when he was 
placed in solitary confinement for failing a drug test.  He was informed 
that he would have to pay $45 for the sample to be retested.  He was 
also informed that he would remain in solitary confinement for a 
further sixty to ninety days while his appeal challenging the drug test 
was considered.274  The court found that he had established a colorable 
claim based on the right to rehabilitation.  In Antenor v. Dep’t of Corr., 
the court held that visitation was part of rehabilitation, and telephone 
contact was a “crucial component of visitation” because families may 
find “travel to the correctional facility for in-person visitation 
prohibitively expensive.”275  The case was remanded for further 
evidence to ascertain whether the price charged for making prison 
phone calls was unconstitutionally burdensome on the right to 
rehabilitation.276 
 
 267. Id.  
 268. OR. CONST., art. I, § 41. 
 269. OR. CONST., art. I, § 41(3). 
 270. ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 12 (“. . . Criminal administration shall be based upon the following: 
the need for protecting the public, community condemnation of the offender, the rights of victims of 
crimes, restitution from the offender, and the principle of reformation.” (Emphasis added)). 
 271. 816 P.2d 134, 139 (Alaska 1991).  
 272. Id. 
 273. 153 P.3d 303, 309 (Alaska 2007). 
 274. Id. at 307. 
 275. 462 P.3d 1, 15 (Alaska 2020). 
 276. Id. 
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Though West Virginia’s Constitution does not have a reformation 
or rehabilitation clause, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia held in Cooper v. Gwinn that incarcerated people have a 
statutory right to rehabilitation which is guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause of the West Virginia Constitution.277  The Department of 
Corrections was required by statute to “establish, maintain and direct 
a varied program of education for inmates in all institutions.”278  The 
Due Process Clause was deemed to require that incarcerated people 
“enjoy the benefit of this legislatively enacted rule of law.”279  It was 
evident, the court found, that the legislature required rehabilitation to 
be a primary goal of the state’s correctional system.280  The evidence 
established that the Department had not made a “real and substantial 
effort to implement appropriate rehabilitative programs” at the state’s 
prison for women.281  The court ordered the Department to consult 
standards promulgated by the American Correctional Association and 
the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections and to prepare a plan 
to implement education, rehabilitation, and treatment programs.282 
No challenge has yet been asserted to solitary confinement as an 
infringement on the right to rehabilitation.  Recognition of the right to 
rehabilitation and its application to visitation, as in the case of Alaska, 
and to prison programs, as in the case of Alaska and West Virginia, 
would certainly ameliorate some of the sensory deprivation and 
isolation caused by solitary confinement. Ultimately, it may also be 
used to invalidate solitary confinement altogether, namely because 
evidence about the detrimental effect of the practice on life skills and 
emotional capacity could be used to bolster a claim that the right has 
been violated.  
E. Prohibition of Unnecessary Rigor 
Six state constitutions prohibit “unnecessary rigor”283 or abuse 
 
 277. 298 S.E.2d 781, 788-789 (W. Va. 1982). 
 278. W.VA. CODE ANN. § 62-13-4 (repealed 2018). 
 279. 298 S.E.2d at 788. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 793. 
 282. Id. at 794-795. 
 283. IND. CONST. art I, § 15 (“No person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with 
unnecessary rigor”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“No person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with 
unnecessary rigor”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“[N]o person arrested and confined in jail shall be treated 
with unnecessary rigor”); UTAH CONST. art I, § 9 (“. . . Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor”); WYO. CONST. art I, § 16 (“No person arrested and confined in jail shall be 
treated with unnecessary rigor . . .”). 
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during arrest or incarceration.284  While some of the prohibitions refer 
to jails rather than prisons, the titles of the provisions and judicial 
interpretations indicate that the protections apply to people in prison 
as well. 
The Oregon Supreme Court has adopted the broadest interpretation 
of unnecessary rigor.  In Sterling v. Cupp, the court held that the clause 
is violated where “a particular prison or police practice would be 
recognized as an abuse to the extent that it cannot be justified by 
necessity.”285  In that case, the court held that the unnecessary rigor 
clause prohibited the practice of subjecting incarcerated men to pat-
down searches by female prison officers.286  Recognizing that the claim 
involved a privacy interest, the court reasoned that the guarantee 
against unnecessary rigor was “a more cogent premise than a federal 
right of privacy.”287  While the prohibition was not restricted to 
“beatings and other forms of brutality,” it did not encompass all 
methods and conditions of punishment.288  In the instant case, the 
court’s interpretation did not “disregard the numerous and pervasive 
conditions intrinsic to the life of prisoners,” finding that “even 
convicted prisoners retain claims to personal dignity, and [that] . . . 
under the conditions of arrest and imprisonment the relation between 
the sexes poses particularly sensitive issues.”289  Women in Oregon’s 
prisons were not subjected to frisk searches by male officers, and 
therefore, the court reasoned that incarcerated men should not be 
denied the same proprieties.290  Necessity, which might have justified 
the practice, was not established by the employment of male or female 
corrections officers.291 
One scholar has observed as significant the Sterling court’s view 
that the unnecessary rigor clause recognizes harm to dignity because 
such an interpretation “implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of 
psychological pain.”292  Psychological damage could thus support an 
unnecessary rigor challenge to solitary confinement itself.293  
However, the clause has rarely been invoked in challenges to prison 
 
 284. GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ XVII (“. . . nor shall any person be abused in being arrested, while 
under arrest, or in prison”). 
 285. 625 P.2d 123, 130 (Or. 1981). 
        286.   Id. at 137. 
 287. Id. at 129. 
 288. Id. at 129-130. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. at 132-133. 
 291. Id. at 136. 
 292. Linda Hemphill, Challenging Conditions of Confinement: A State Constitutional Approach, 
20 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 409, 432 (1984). 
 293. Id. 
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conditions and has not yet been considered in relation to solitary 
confinement.294 
In Bott v. DeLand, the Supreme Court of Utah approved the Sterling 
court’s unnecessary rigor standard in its interpretation of Utah’s 
unnecessary rigor clause.295 Mr. Bott alleged negligence and 
unnecessary rigor on the part of Utah State prison officials as a result 
of inadequate medical care.296  He had reported blurred vision and was 
placed on a waiting list to see an optometrist.297  His vision continued 
to deteriorate over the course of four weeks to the point that he lost 
vision in both eyes and began suffering from severe headaches, nausea, 
dizziness, and body aches.298 Despite repeatedly reporting these 
symptoms to the staff, he was not examined or referred to the prison 
physician.299 When he was finally assessed six weeks later, he was 
diagnosed with malignant hypertension and severe renal failure.300  By 
the time of the trial, he was dependent on hemodialysis and had a 
greatly reduced life expectancy.301  One of the issues on appeal was 
whether damages were available for violations of the unnecessary rigor 
provision.  The court emphasized that “unnecessary rigor must be 
treatment that is clearly excessive or deficient and unjustified, not 
merely the frustrations, inconveniences and irritations that are 
common to prison life.”302 
In Dexter v. Bosko, the Supreme Court of Utah overturned the 
dismissal of a claim of unnecessary rigor in a case stemming from a 
vehicle accident in which a man being transported while in custody 
became paralyzed and died five years later due to complications from 
his injuries.303 The court held that the unnecessary rigor clause 
“protects persons arrested or imprisoned from the imposition of 
circumstances on them during their confinement that demand more . . 
. than society is entitled to require. The restriction on unnecessary rigor 
 
 294. See, e.g., Smith v. Dep’t of Corr., 182 P.3d 250 (Ct. App. Or. 2008) (holding that restrictions 
on prisoners’ mail were valid and did not violate the unnecessary rigor clause); Barrett v. Peters, 383 P.3d 
813 (Or. 2016) (affirming that incarcerated people from Oregon retained their state constitutional rights, 
including the right not to be subject to unnecessary rigor, when they were transferred to other states under 
an Interstate Corrections Compact). 
 295. 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996). 
        296.   Id. at 735.  
        297.   Id.  
 
 
        298.   Id.  
        299.   Id.  
        300.   Id.  
 301. Id.  
 302. Id. at 741. 
 303. 184 P.3d 592 (Utah 2008). 
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is focused on the circumstances and nature of the process and 
conditions of confinement.”304 
The court compared the unnecessary rigor clause to the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.  While the two provisions 
overlap, the court noted, their purposes are different: “torture may be 
cruel and unusual but strict silence during given hours may not.  Strict 
silence, however, may impose unnecessary rigor or unduly harsh 
restrictions.”305  This interpretation indicates that the prohibition of 
unnecessary rigor is broader than that against cruel and unusual 
punishment and may cover conditions common to solitary 
confinement. 
In both Bott and Dexter, the Supreme Court of Utah held that money 
damages were available for violations of the unnecessary rigor clause.  
Dexter narrowed the holding of Bott by confining the availability of 
damages to cases where officials act with flagrant culpability.306  The 
flagrancy standard is similar to the test for qualified immunity because 
it requires “the contours of the right [to] be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that 
right.”307  Where the official is unaware of a clear prohibition, the court 
requires proof that an obvious and known serious risk of harm existed 
and that the official acted with knowledge of that risk without 
reasonable justification.308 
In State v. Houston, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the 
unnecessary rigor provision did not apply to a seventeen-year-old’s 
challenge to a sentence of life without parole.309 Adopting an 
interpretation different from the Oregon Supreme Court in Sterling, 
the court in Houston held that Utah’s provision focuses on prison 
conditions, while a challenge to the length of a sentence is more 
appropriately considered under the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause.310 
The courts in Indiana have taken a rather narrower view of 
unnecessary rigor as applied to conditions of confinement, despite 
dictum in an 1860 Indiana Supreme Court decision which referred to 
solitary confinement as a form of unnecessary rigor, stating: 
 
 304. Id. at 596. 
 305. Id.  
 306. Id. at 597-598 (citing Spackman v. Board of Educ., 16 P.3d 533 at 538-539) (Utah 2000) 
(holding money damages were available for violation of open education and due process clauses in the 
state constitution)). 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. 353 P.3d 55, 72 (Utah 2015). 
 310. Id. 
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The very essence of punishment, and the sole use of the prison walls, is the 
confinement of the convict within them; his real exclusion from the rest of 
the world, rendering him for the time civiliter mortuus.  Humanity indeed 
forbids, as unnecessary rigor, that his confinement should be absolutely 
solitary, or that all his natural and civil rights should be temporarily 
annihilated …311 
More recently, that court held in Ratcliff v. Cohn that the placement of 
a fourteen-year-old in an adult prison’s special needs unit did not 
violate Indiana’s unnecessary rigor clause.312  The plaintiff contended 
that her placement in the unit was inappropriate because she was living 
with adults with severe psychological disorders who were incapable of 
functioning in the prison’s general population.313  The court held that 
the clause prohibited only physical abuse and that the girl’s placement 
in the restrictive and difficult conditions of an adult special needs unit 
did not rise to the level of unnecessary rigor.314 
Another Indiana case, Smith v. Dep’t of Corr., followed the Ratcliff 
decision and narrowly construed the concept of physical abuse.315  In 
that case, Mr. Smith complained to prison staff that his cell was 
flooding because other people blocked their toilets, so the floor of his 
cell was covered in water and fecal matter.316  He kicked his cell door 
to attract prison officials’ attention and requested a mop.317  The staff 
told him to remove his shoes, but when he refused to do so they entered 
his cell, shot mace pellets at him, stripped him down to his underwear, 
and placed him in full restraints for two hours.318  Upon returning to 
his cell, Mr. Smith found the mace had not been cleaned up and caused 
him further harm.319  Without providing any explanation, the court 
concluded that the actions of the prison officers did not constitute 
physical abuse.320  The court then found that the prison officials were 
justified in telling Mr. Smith to remove his shoes because he had 
kicked his cell door and thus the officials were “acting to maintain 
order and discipline” in a volatile situation.321 
The courts of Georgia, Tennessee, and Wyoming have not issued 
 
 311. Helton v. Miller, 14 Ind. 577, 585 (1860) (emphasis added). 
 312. 693 N.E.2d 530, 541 (Ind. 1998). 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. (citing Kokenes v. State, 13 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. 1938), Bonahoon v. State, 178 N.E. 570 (Ind. 
1931) and Roberts v. State, 307 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. 1974)). 
 315. 871 N.E.2d 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
        316.   Id. at 981.  
        317.   Id.  
 318. Id. at 975.  
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 984. 
 321. Id.  
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substantive rulings on the unnecessary rigor and abuse clauses in their 
constitutions. In 1898, however, the Wyoming Supreme Court referred 
to the prohibition against unnecessary rigor as one of several clauses 
underpinning the “fundamental law that the Penal Code shall be 
founded upon the humane principles of reformation and 
prevention.”322 
Unnecessary rigor and abuse prohibitions offer another avenue for 
additional challenges to conditions within solitary confinement and the 
practice itself.  This is so particularly in jurisdictions that apply the 
provisions to conditions of confinement, such as Oregon and Utah.  
F. Recognition of Dignity 
The constitutions of Montana and Puerto Rico explicitly announce 
that “the dignity of the human being is inviolable.”323  The Puerto 
Rican courts have not had occasion to interpret the provision. 
In Montana, however, the principle has informed the interpretation 
of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  In Walker v. 
State, the Montana Supreme Court held that carceral conditions 
imposed on a mentally ill man were “an affront to the inviolable right 
of human dignity” and constituted cruel and unusual punishment by 
exacerbating his mental health condition.324  Mr. Walker had been 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and his condition deteriorated after he 
stopped taking his prescribed medication due to side effects.325  The 
prison staff placed him on a series of “behavior management plans,” 
which were described as “tools using a ‘carrot-and-stick approach’ of 
withdrawing and returning privileges based on conduct.”326  In 
accordance with these plans, Mr. Walker was placed in isolation in a 
bare cell, deprived of all of his clothing and bedding for several days 
at a time, and the water to his sink and toilet was turned off.327  He was 
not given hot meals and instead he received only slices of meat and 
cheese served with bread.328  Though the behavior plans were intended 
to last for a maximum of two days, Mr. Walker was required to have 
at least twenty-four hours of “clear conduct” before his clothing and 
other necessities were returned to him.329  Because of his illness, he 
 
 322. State v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Laramie Cty., 55 P. 451 (Wyo. 1898). 
 323. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; P.R. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 324. 68 P.3d 872, 885 (Mont. 2003). 
        325.   Id. at 885.  
 326. Id.  
 327. Id. at 876. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 876. 
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was unable to comply. 
A psychiatrist testified that the restrictive behavioral plans were 
counter-therapeutic, punitive, and cruel.330  In his opinion, the practice 
of placing a person “in a bare cell, naked, and forced to sleep on a 
concrete slab is humiliating, degrading, and extremely painful 
physically.”331 Evidence was presented that prison staff ignored 
complaints about the unhygienic state of the unit where Mr. Walker 
was segregated; the cell walls were said to be encrusted with blood, 
feces, and vomit.332   
The court held that the right to dignity was fundamental and 
triggered “the highest level of scrutiny and . . . protection.”333  While 
cases alleging cruel and unusual punishment were usually decided 
without reference to the right to dignity, in this case, the court found 
the right especially relevant, holding that the state constitution “forbids 
correctional practices which permit prisons in the name of behavior 
modification to disregard the innate dignity of human beings, 
especially in the context where those persons suffer from serious 
mental illness.”334 
In such circumstances, the court held, the prison had “crossed into 
the realm of psychological torture.”335  While the cruel and unusual 
punishment provision did not guarantee that Mr. Walker would not 
suffer from “some psychological effects from incarceration or 
segregation,” the treatment he experienced violated the dignity clause 
and amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. 
The right to personal dignity was also acknowledged in Stirling v. 
Cupp, discussed above, in the interpretation of Oregon’s unnecessary 
rigor clause, even though the Oregon Constitution does not mention 
personal dignity.336  Other state courts have also referred to dignity in 
relation to aspects of criminal punishment.337 The absence of an 
 
 330. Id. at 882. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 883. 
 333. Id. (citing Dorwart v. Caraway, 58 P.3d 128 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring)). 
 334. Id. at 884. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 620 (1981).  
 337. Johanna Kalb, Litigating Dignity: A Human Rights Framework, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1725, 1730 
(2010) (“For example, California, Kansas, and West Virginia test the constitutional validity of criminal 
punishment by considering whether it is ‘so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it 
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity’” (citing State v. Gomez, 235 
P.3d 1203, 1210 (Kan. 2010) (quoting State v. Freeman, 574 P.2d 950, 956 (Kan. 1978))); In Re Lynch, 
503 P.2d 921, 930 (Cal. 1972) and State v. Booth, 685 S.E.2d 701, 708 (W. Va. 2009))).  See also Cootz 
v. State, 785 P.2d 163 (Idaho 1989) (Bistline, J., concurring) (“[C]ompetent authority suggests that an 
inmate is entitled to more rights and a greater degree of dignity than seems to be the present norm” (citing 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 234 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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express constitutional reference to dignity has not prevented it from 
influencing constitutional interpretations. Even in federal courts, 
though the right to dignity is not explicitly recognized by the Federal 
Constitution, the principle has been referred to in various Eighth 
Amendment challenges though its parameters have never been fully 
articulated.338  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that dignity is “the 
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment.”339  Thus dignity can 
inform the interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment and courts 
have the opportunity to invoke the principle in all cases concerning 
conditions of confinement.  The harm and deprivations of solitary 
confinement call for even greater recognition of the right to dignity in 
constitutional interpretation. 
G. Barriers to Relief 
Some state statutes impose the same barriers on relief as those 
imposed by the PLRA.  The most common are limits on claims by 
incarcerated people seeking to proceed in forma pauperis and the 
three-strike provision.340  Another common requirement is that all 
administrative remedies must be exhausted before court action is 
pursued.341 
Notably, only six states prevent people in prison from recovering 
damages for mental or emotional injury without a prior showing of 
physical injury as the federal PLRA does.342  Of these six states, two  
impose narrower bars on actions for emotional injury than their federal 
counterpart. In Alabama, the bar on recovery for mental or emotional 
 
 338. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (holding that the act of chaining an incarcerated 
person to a post violated “the basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment, [which] is nothing less 
than the dignity of man” (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100)); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) 
(holding that imposition of the death penalty on a person under the age of eighteen violated the Eighth 
Amendment and stating that the Amendment “reaffirms the duty of the government to restrict the dignity 
of all persons.”); Brown v. Plata, 536 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (finding overcrowding and lack of mental 
health care in California’s prisons grossly inadequate and stating that incarcerated people “retain the 
essence of human dignity inherent in all persons.  Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”)  See also Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence 
of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011); Laura Rovner, Dignity and the Eighth Amendment: A New 
Approach to Challenging Solitary Confinement, 9 ADVANCE 3 (2015). 
 339. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100. 
 340. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8804 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.085(7) (West 2004); LA. 
STAT. ANN. § 15:1186(F) (West 1997). 
 341. See, e.g. ALA. CODE § 14-15-4 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-17.5-102.3 (West 1998); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4206 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-52,138 (West 1994); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 454.415 (West 2010). 
 342. ALA. CODE § 14-15-4(g) (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4222 (West 2000); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 15:1184E (1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5511(1) (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57 § 566.4A (West 
2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-62-3 (2010). 
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injury applies only to actions filed pro se (although most of these 
claims are brought pro se).343  Meanwhile, Idaho’s statute limits civil 
actions for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody but 
allows such actions to be pursued upon a showing of either physical 
injury or a “diagnosed severe and disabling mental illness.”344  This 
provision therefore avoids the PLRA’s artificial distinction between 
physical and mental harm. 
Some state restrictions on challenges to prison conditions are even 
more onerous than the PLRA.  For example, state courts may be 
empowered to deduct good time credits for in forma pauperis 
applications that are deemed frivolous, in bad faith, or deficient in 
material information.345  Other statutes authorize courts to impose fees 
and costs, disciplinary segregation, and even revoke access to property 
such as televisions, radios, and stereos.346   
However, courts can also limit these barriers through constitutional 
interpretation.  The Alaska Supreme Court held in Barber v. State, 
Dep’t of Corr. that while the state may have a legitimate interest in 
reducing frivolous litigation by people in prison, the due process clause 
of the state constitution prevents that interest from barring an indigent 
individual’s challenge to a disciplinary penalty.347  The erroneous 
conduct of disciplinary proceedings was deemed to be of such 
importance as to override the state’s interest in preventing frivolous 
litigation.348   
Notably, no state statutes impose the same limitations on relief as 
those that constrain the federal courts.  Therefore, state courts may 
grant broader and prompter relief than their federal counterparts.  An 
example of a broader approach to relief granted by a state court can be 
found in Harrah v. Leverette, where the West Virginia Supreme Court 
held prison officials violated the Due Process Clause and the Eighth 
Amendment by placing people in solitary confinement without due 
process and committing severe physical abuse against those people.349  
In considering the appropriate remedy, the court indicated its 
preference not to interfere with prison management, but it went on to 
 
 343. See, e.g., Jennifer Winslow, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement 
Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was it Meant To? 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655, 1665 (2002) (citing ROGER A. 
HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS AND 
JAILS, A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 21-22 (1995) (noting that in 1995, 96 percent of prisoner 
lawsuits were filed pro se)). 
344  
 345. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 261 § 29(f). 
 346. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-106-203 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.035 (West 1995). 
 347. 314 P.3d 58 (Alaska 2013). 
 348. Id. at 65-66. 
 349. 271 S.E.2d 322 (W.Va. 1980). 
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state that: 
Prison does not strip an individual of all human dignity.  This court is 
dedicated to the preservation of the rights vested in every person by our 
constitution and the federal constitution.  Any attempt by the government 
to abridge those rights is anathema to us; repeated infractions, despite clear 
proscriptions by this court and federal courts, are unforgivable.350 
Referring to a previous opinion concerning Eighth Amendment 
violations at a juvenile detention facility, the court remarked that 
“when the state is guilty of extraordinary dereliction, discharge is a 
remedy.  We warned prison officials about its possible use in previous 
opinions … We will not continue to witness cruel and unusual 
punishment and blatant due process violations by prison officials and 
respond with injunctions and admonitions.”351 
Emphasizing that the Department of Corrections “must understand 
that abuse of the constitutional rights of prisoners may result in release 
of the victims,” the court ordered the implementation of a plan tailored 
to each person affected by the violations to reduce the degree of 
restraint to which they were subject.  The court suggested that the plans 
might include release from parole or prison, reduction in sentence 
length, or transfer to a less restrictive facility.352  The court described 
this remedy as a “compromise . . . between unconditional release and 
continuation of present status.”353 While the court was reluctant to 
release people for constitutional deprivations that did not relate to the 
charges for which they were incarcerated, it reiterated that the prison’s 
activities “must be permanently corrected or else the government may 
be enjoined from putting any convicted criminals in jail or prison.”354 
Though Harrah v. Leverette was decided prior to the enactment of 
the PLRA’s limitation on the scope of federal courts’ remedies, that 
statute would not have restricted the West Virginia court in any event.  
Moreover, at the time this case was decided, federal courts were 
generally not issuing orders that were similar in breadth to this court’s 
order. 
Qualified immunity is available in some states to counter claims of 
violations of state constitutional rights.355  Nevertheless, there has been 
some movement to restrict the immunity.  In 2007, the California Court 
 
 350. Id. at 331. 
 351. Id. at 332 (referring to State ex rel. K.W. Werner, 242 S.E.2d 907 (W.Va. 1978)). 
 352. Id. at 332-333. 
        353.   Id. at 333.  
 354. Id.  
 355. See, e.g. Duarte v. Healy, 537 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Mass. 1989) (holding that while the 
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act did not expressly provide for qualified immunity, the state legislature 
intended to incorporate the defense as recognized by the federal courts.).  
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of Appeal declined to allow qualified immunity as a defense to a state 
civil rights claim on the basis that the doctrine was “entirely a creation 
of the United States Supreme Court.”356  The court held that if the state 
legislature had intended to incorporate qualified immunity into state 
law, it would have done so.357  Other states, including Colorado and 
Connecticut, have passed legislation to abolish or limit the qualified 
immunity of police officers.358 
IV. THE CASE FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE TO 
CHALLENGE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
The jurisprudence and constitutional provisions discussed in this 
Article show that state courts and state constitutions offer different 
avenues to pursue challenges to solitary confinement that have been 
largely unexplored to date.  There are different justifications for state 
courts to develop their own constitutional jurisprudence separate from 
federal jurisprudence.  In his analysis of Justice Brennan’s 1977 article 
that called on state courts to increase constitutional protections for 
individual rights, California Supreme Court Justice Goodwin Liu 
suggests that the legitimacy of state constitutional jurisprudence “does 
not primarily depend on the development of a distinctive, state-
centered jurisprudence.”359  Rather, in Justice Liu’s view, state courts 
may depart from federal precedent because of distinctive constitutional 
language, or because they disagree with federal constitutional 
reasoning.360 The precise contours of constitutional provisions, Justice 
Liu writes, are “open to vigorous debate, often with no easy 
resolution.”361  Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit has suggested 
that some state courts diminish their constitutions by interpreting them 
in lockstep with the Federal Constitution.  He describes as 
“inexplicable” the notion that “the meaning of a federal guarantee 
proves the meaning of an independent state guarantee.”362 
There are good reasons to support the development of state 
constitutional jurisprudence relating to solitary confinement that does 
not simply follow the federal jurisprudence.  The first is the locus of 
 
 356. Venegas v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741, 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
 357. Id. at 753. 
 358. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131(1)(b) (West 2020) and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-
571k(d)(1) (West 2020). 
 359. Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1312 (2017). 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 1338. 
 362. Jeffrey Sutton, What Does – and Does Not – Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 
687, 707-708 (2011). 
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incarceration and the dominant role played by state courts in 
sentencing, as recognized by Ohio’s Eighth District Court of Appeals 
in the case of In Re Lamb.363  As of December 2018, approximately 
88% of people incarcerated in prisons were held in state custody.364  
Given their central role in sentencing the vast majority of incarcerated 
people in the country, state courts should independently scrutinize the 
conditions of confinement in state prisons. 
A second reason is that state courts may be better fora than federal 
courts for pursuing claims of violations of constitutional rights 
specifically relating to prison conditions.  Justice Liu and Judge Sutton 
both address this issue in the context of claims for violations of 
constitutional rights generally.  Justice Liu contends that federal courts 
may decline to enforce constitutional rights to their “full conceptual 
boundaries” because such an interpretation would potentially bind not 
only the federal government but also the states.365  Of course, the same 
consideration does not apply in reverse to state courts’ interpretations.   
Further, Justice Liu notes that while most state court judges face 
greater electoral accountability, in contrast to the life tenure of federal 
judges, the claim that state courts are less responsive than federal 
courts to individual rights claims is not clear cut.366  This can certainly 
be seen in the context of constitutional claims relating to prisons, 
where both state and federal courts vary in terms of receptivity to the 
rights of incarcerated people. While there is an argument that 
majoritarian pressures are thought to make state courts less responsive, 
it could also be said that recent moves toward reforming solitary 
confinement in some state legislatures may influence state judges to be 
more receptive to the need for closer scrutiny of the practice. 
Moreover, as both Justice Liu and Judge Sutton acknowledge, 
nearly all state constitutions are easier to amend than their federal 
counterpart.367  While Justice Liu suggested that the prospect of a 
constitutional decision being overruled, in effect by an electoral 
initiative, could lead to judicial restraint, on the other hand, he 
recognized that such accountability “may aid rather than diminish the 
legitimacy of counter-majoritarian decision-making by state 
courts.”368  Describing the different methods by which constitutional 
 
 363. 296 N.E. 2d 280 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973). 
 364. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2018 3 (2020). 
 365. Goodwin Liu, supra, note 359, at 1330. 
 366. Judge Sutton has pointed out that eighty-seven percent of state judges throughout the country 
face some form of election during their careers, though the timing and methods of elections vary in each 
state. Jeffrey Sutton, supra, note 362, at 700. 
 367. Goodwin Liu, supra, note 359, at 1331; Jeffrey Sutton, supra, note 362, at 692-693. 
 368. Goodwin Liu, supra, note 359, at 1331. 
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amendments may take place, Judge Sutton noted that the most 
common method of amending a state constitution is legislative, but 
constitutional conventions and popular initiatives are also used in 
some states, all subject to different requirements and limitations.369 
A further reason for state courts to continue developing their own 
constitutional jurisprudence separate from federal jurisprudence is the 
role of state-specific influences on constitutional interpretation and the 
fact that the drafters of the Federal Constitution looked to the language 
of states’ constitutions and experiences when tasked with drafting the 
federal version.  Some state provisions, for example, predate the 
Eighth Amendment or its application to the states. 
Given that these justifications weigh in favor of state courts 
developing separate constitutional jurisprudence without simply 
adopting the federal jurisprudence, the question arises as to why so few 
challenges concerning solitary confinement have been pursued in state 
courts to date.  It may simply be that, as Justice Liu observes, judges, 
and indeed law school graduates, “are primarily trained in federal law 
and find it familiar.”370  The body of federal case law relating to 
solitary confinement is certainly “abundant and well-developed,” 
albeit flawed.   
In addition, most state courts have chosen to follow federal 
precedent when ruling on state constitutional challenges to excessive 
sentences, with the result that few sentences are overturned on the 
basis of disproportionality.371  Given that there have been significantly 
more state constitutional challenges to excessive sentences than prison 
conditions, and these challenges have often been unsuccessful, 
litigants seeking to challenge prison conditions may be dissuaded from 
bringing such challenges in state courts.   
There may be further practical reasons as to why cases concerning 
solitary confinement are not based on state constitutional arguments.  
Many challenges to prison conditions are brought by pro se litigants 
who rely on litigation handbooks based on federal jurisprudence.  Even 
when litigants have legal representation, they are often represented by 
national non-profit organizations whose expertise and experience is in 
the federal courts.   
This is not to say that state courts and state jurisprudence are not 
 
 369. Jeffrey Sutton, supra, note 362, at 693-698. 
 370. Goodwin Liu, supra, note 359, at 1315. 
 371. William W. Berry III, Cruel and Unusual Non-Capital Punishments, AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
forthcoming (October 20, 2020); William W. Berry III, Cruel State Punishments, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1201, 
1205-06 (2020) (“[A]lmost all states have an analogue to the Eighth Amendment.  In most states, the 
application of such provisions has not exceeded the scope of the Eighth Amendment, meaning that the 
state constitutional provisions have not added any further restrictions beyond that of the federal 
provision.”). 
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worthy of further exploration as an alternative avenue for future 
challenges.  The absence of the PLRA’s limitations on the scope of 
relief that state courts can grant weighs in favor of pursuing litigation 
in state courts, particularly in those jurisdictions that have adopted 
broader interpretations of constitutional provisions that may be 
favorable to people seeking to challenge solitary confinement.  Recent 
state court decisions ruling on habeas and mandamus petitions 
concerning prison officials’ failures to protect incarcerated people 
from the risks posed by COVID-19 may raise awareness of the 
potential for incarcerated people to obtain broader and quicker relief 
in these venues than they otherwise might in federal courts.372 
CONCLUSION 
Incarcerated people seeking to challenge conditions in solitary 
confinement as a violation of state constitutional rights still face some 
of the same barriers that apply to federal challenges.  Nevertheless, 
state jurisprudence offers a range of alternatives to improve judicial 
scrutiny of such conditions.  State courts can determine to what extent 
conditions comport with their state’s conception of individual rights.  
In interpreting state constitutional provisions, these courts can look to 
statutes, common law, and state values to incorporate principles like 
dignity, humane treatment, and the prohibition of unnecessary rigor.  
Indeed, even in the absence of relevant constitutional provisions or 
state-specific values or history, state jurisprudence permits such an 
exploration, and courts need not be constrained by the limitations of 
federal constitutional jurisprudence. 
Given that most incarcerated people are held in state prisons, and 
many state legislatures are currently addressing solitary confinement 
reform, the time is ripe for state courts to take a more active role in 
interpreting individual rights, examining solitary confinement 
 
 372. In the case of In re Von Staich, 270 Cal.Rptr.3d 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020), the California Court 
of Appeal ordered a fifty percent reduction in the population at San Quentin State Prison to mitigate a 
Covid-19 outbreak.  That relief has since been frozen by the State Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal 
has been directed to consider the necessity of an evidentiary hearing to investigate whether prison 
authorities took any steps that would contradict the court’s earlier finding that officials acted with 
deliberate indifference by failing to follow public health advice.  Order Granting Petition for Review, In 
Re Von Staich, 477 P.3d 537 (Cal. 2020).  See also North Carolina Conference of the NAACP et al. v. 
Cooper et al. (N.C. Sup. Ct. June 16, 2020) (granting preliminary injunction based on a finding that 
plaintiffs were likely to establish deliberate indifference to substantial risk of serious harm created by 
overcrowding and cohort-based social distancing, transfers, and disparate levels of Covid-19 protections 
in different state correctional facilities.  The court declined to decide the legal standard that applied under 
the State Constitution, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to satisfy the Eighth Amendment standard 
of showing that prison officials had been deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm.). 
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